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ABSTRACT
Intracorporate arbitration provisions (lAPs) shift disputes
over firms' internal affairs from public courts to private arbitration.
These disputes affect the agency costs associated with governing a
company, which in turn affect firm value. Thus, afirm that adopts an
lAP should expect it to cause an increase or decrease to firm value.
Beyond their effects on firm value, lAPs will also test assumptions
about shareholders' ability to discipline corporate management and
states' authority to regulate firms formed under their laws. In
anticipating the emergence of lAPs, markets, practitioners, and
scholars must confront what they are to look like and how they are to
work. This prospect is uncertain. An lAP could increase firm value by,
for example, limiting unmeritorious litigation, or it could reduce firm
value by, for example, insulating management from meritorious
claims. This article shows that IAPs will not lead inextricably to either
of those outcomes. In doing so, it asks a simplifying question: for a
given firm, will adopting an L4P likely lead to its value going up, or
down?
That question is answered by viewing IAPs as a tool by which
firms may treat the civil procedure that is applied to their
intracorporate disputes as a value lever. Civil procedure determines
whether meritorious claims are vindicated and whether unmeritorious
claims are defeated. In addition, civil procedure determines both how
long it takes to reach resolution and what resources are required to
do so (assuming the substantive law and facts remain constant
regardless the procedure). In other words, whether an intracorporate
dispute is resolved fairly and efficiently is determined by the civil
procedure chosen for it. Those two factors-how claims are resolved
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on the merits and what is required in terms of time and resources to
resolve them-represent agency costs that help drive firm value up or
down. Because "up " is preferable, this article introduces a normative,
institutional model of intracorporate arbitration aimed at achieving
that outcome, in which afirm adopting an IAP must make a credible
commitment to a credible arbitral institution.
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INTRODUCTION
The Carlyle Group (Carlyle) is an innovator in the private-
equity and leveraged-buyout businesses, managing over $100 billion
in assets and indirectly employing hundreds of thousands of people
through its portfolio companies.1 As it prepared to go public in 2012,
Carlyle set out to also be a corporate-governance innovator by
including a mandatory arbitration provision in its partnership
agreement, the document governing its internal management. Under
this provision, Carlyle and its equity holders agreed to submit disputes
arising under their partnership agreement or state partnership law to
binding arbitration, rather than public courts.2 But, after the Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC)'s Division of Corporation Finance
declined to accelerate Carlyle's offering while the arbitration
provision was in place,3 it opted instead to mandate that all internal
claims be brought in the courts of Delaware, its state of formation,
instead of arbitration.4 This innovative move had become a road block
to Carlyle's going public, and so it settled for a litigation provision
closer to the status quo.
Although neither federal law nor SEC regulation expressly
prohibits mandatory arbitration provisions, Carlyle's example
reflected a long-held view of SEC commissioners and staff that these
provisions are inconsistent with the securities laws' non-waiver
1. The Carlyle Group L.P., Amend. No. 2 to Registration Statement on Form
S-i, at 1 (Jan. 10, 2012) [hereinafter Carlyle Registration Statement].
2. Id. at A-58-59.
3. Letter of Pamela Long, Assistant Dir., SEC, Div. of Corp. Fin., to Jeffrey
W. Ferguson, Gen. Counsel, The Carlyle Group L.P., at 1 (Feb. 3, 2012).
4. See The Carlyle Group L.P., Amend. No. 4 to Registration Statement on
Form S-1, at A-58-59 (Mar. 15, 2012). This article is about business entities-
firms-that may take different organizational forms--corporations, partnerships,
limited liability companies, and the like-and that have different types of governing
documents--charters, bylaws, partnership agreements, and the like. Although this
article uses the publicly traded corporation as its archetype, its arguments apply to
other types of firms, public or private, as well, and uses them interchangeably. Cf
Peter Molk & Verity Winship, LLCs and the Private Ordering of Dispute
Resolution, 41 J. CORP. L. 795, 805 (2016) (discussing mandatory arbitration
agreements in Delaware limited liability company agreements).
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provisions.5 Whether that view will hold much longer is uncertain, as
at least two SEC members have signaled a new openness to these
intracorporate arbitration provisions (LAPs). During a summer 2017
speech, Commissioner Michael Piwowar cited Carlyle's experience
while encouraging companies to seek relief from the SEC to include
mandatory arbitration provisions in their governing documents.6 This
comment, offered in response to an audience question, received quick
attention in corporate-govemance circles. The next day, legal
commentator Alison Frankel wrote that "[t]his could be the start of
something huge," noting that Commissioner Piwowar was suggesting
that "the SEC is open to the idea of allowing companies contemplating
initial public offerings to include mandatory shareholder arbitration
provisions in corporate charters."7 Professor Hal Scott, a supporter of
mandatory shareholder arbitration, called the remarks "an important
invitation to U.S. public companies" to adopt a practice he believes
would have a positive effect for investors and markets. 8
5. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78cc ("Any condition,
stipulation, or provision binding any person to waive compliance with any provision
of this title or of any rule or regulation thereunder, or of any rule of a self-regulatory
organization, shall be void."); Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77n ("Any
condition, stipulation, or provision binding any person acquiring any security to
waive compliance with any provision of this title or of the rules and regulations of
the [SEC] shall be void."); see also SEC, Div. of Corp. Fin., No-Action Letter,
Pfizer, Inc. (Feb. 22, 2012) ("We note that there appears to be some basis for your
view that implementation of the [mandatory arbitration bylaws] proposal would
cause the company to violate the federal securities laws.") [hereinafter Pfizer No-
Action Letter]; Letter of James D. Cox et al., to Mary Jo White, Chair, SEC (Oct.
30, 2013) (noting mandatory arbitration's disfavored view within the SEC, and
requesting that the SEC "evaluate the validity of corporate provisions restricting
shareholder access to the courts") [hereinafter Cox Letter].
6. Michael Piwowar, Comm'r, SEC, Remarks on Businesses, Regulation and
the Economy (Jul. 17, 2017) https://www.c-span.org/video/?431364-1/michael-
piwowar-remarks-businesses-regulation-economy ("For shareholder lawsuits, right,
there is, companies can come to us to ask for relief to put in mandatory arbitration
into their charter. There was a company under the prior administration that thought
about doing that when they IPOed but decided to pull back because Staff would not
give them comfort they would accelerate their filing. I would encourage companies
to come and talk to us about that.").
7. Alison Frankel, Shareholder alert: SEC commissioner floats class-action-
killing proposal, REUTERS (Jul. 18, 2017) https://www.reuters.com/article/us-otc-
arbitration/shareholder-alert-sec-commissioner-floats-class-action-killing-proposal.
8. Hal S. Scott, Shareholders Deserve Right to Choose Mandatory Arbitration,





Later that year, SEC Chairman Jay Clayton told the Senate
Banking Committee that the SEC had not articulated a definitive view
on the issue, suggested it was a question for state corporate law, and
declined to endorse the idea that public courts are the only appropriate
fora to bring disputes over a public company's internal affairs.9 Taken
together, Chairman Clayton and Commissioner Piwowar's remarks
represent a shift-at least a rhetorical one-from SEC practice
opposing intracorporate arbitration to a new openness to it.l 0 Although
the SEC has yet to announce a change in policy regarding IAPs-
whether in the form of rulemaking, waivers, or interpretive
guidance-at least one capital-markets lawyer has reported that SEC
staff members are encouraging companies to consider adopting
APs.11 In early 2019, the SEC again signaled its potentially shifting
views. In a no-action letter permitting Johnson & Johnson to exclude
a shareholder proposal for the adoption of a mandatory arbitration
bylaw, the SEC applied Rule 14a-8(i)(2)'s provision that a proposal
may be excluded from a proxy if it would cause the company to violate
state-here, New Jersey-law.1 2 In comparison, almost seven years
earlier, the SEC issued a similar no-action letter to Pfizer, but on the
grounds that a mandatory arbitration bylaw might violate federal
securities law.
13
Although in one view intracorporate arbitration tackles
meritless and value-destroying litigation,14 another points to the
countervailing effect-that these provisions may prevent shareholders
from exercising their rights or from holding management
accountable.15 The first case to test mandatory intracorporate
9. SEC Oversight Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous. & Urban
Affairs, 115th Cong. 2nd Sess. (Sept. 26, 2017) (testimony of SEC Chairman Jay
Clayton) https://www.c-span.org/video/?434649-2/securities-exchange-
commission-oversigh-hearing.
10. See Frankel, supra note 7 (quoting Professor Adam Zimmerman, stating
that "[t]his is important for the signal it's sending .... Piwowar is sending up a flare
- this might be okay with us.").
11. Benjamin Bain, SEC Weighs a Big Gift to Companies: Blocking Investor
Lawsuits, BLOOMBERG (Jan. 26, 2018)
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-01-26/trump-s-sec-mulls-big-gift-
to-companies-blocking-investor-suits ("[A] partner at law firm Simpson Thacher in
Palo Alto, California, said he's heard instances of SEC staff encouraging companies
to come forward with proposals that would require shareholders to use arbitration to
resolve shareholder grievances.").
12. SEC, Div. of Corp. Fin., No-Action, Johnson & Johnson (Feb. 11, 2019).
13. See Pfizer No-Action Letter, supra note 5.
14. See, e.g., Scott, supra note 8.
15. See Cox Letter, supra note 5.
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arbitration provisions in a public company, Corvex Management L.P.
v. Common Wealth REIT, highlights this concern. 16 In Common Wealth
REIT, the trustees of a publicly traded office-building real-estate
investment trust (two of whom held a $77M per year contract to
manage it) resisted an unsolicited takeover bid from two outside
firms. 17 The trustees took defensive measures, including lobbying the
Maryland General Assembly to enact favorable legislation.18 As part
of these measures, the trustees also took the newsworthy step of
amending the trust's bylaws to require arbitration of its internal
disputes, including pending claims that the trustees had violated their
fiduciary duties.'9 A Maryland trial court held the bylaw to be within
the trustees' authority to adopt and to be an enforceable contract under
state law. In addition, the court observed that federal law effected a
strong public policy in favor of enforcing agreements to arbitrate.20
With this result, the trustees were allowed to choose the forum in
which they would defend themselves.
Common Wealth REIT could point to a "dystopian future" in
which corporate management deploys arbitration bylaws to entrench
its control of, and perhaps its ability to extract rents from, a firm.21 Or
IAPs might instead usher in new limits to unmeritorious intracorporate
litigation, saving shareholders across the capital markets countless
sums in legal fees and settlement costs. This article argues that neither
outcome follows necessarily. Rather, adopting an LAP can lead to net
negative or net positive outcomes for shareholders and capital
markets, depending on how it is designed, managed, and enforced.
Given this range of outcomes, the question is not whether these
provisions should be used, but rather, what conditions justify their
adoption.
The degree to which a firm's intracorporate disputes-such as
shareholder-derivative actions-are resolved fairly and efficiently has
an effect, positive or negative, on its economic value. "Fair"
resolutions are the vindication of meritorious claims and the defeat of
unmeritorious claims. "Efficient" resolutions avoid spending time and
16. Corvex Mgmt. L.P. v. CommonWealth REIT, 24-C13-001111, 2013 WL
1915769 (Md. Cir. Ct. May 8, 2013).
17. Id. at*3.
18. Steven Davidoff Solomon, What's at Stake in the Fight Over a REIT, N.Y.
TIMES DEALBOOK (Apr. 18, 2013) https://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/04/18/whats-
at-stake-in-the-fight-over-commonwealth-reit.
19. CommonWealth REIT, No. 24-C13-001111, 2013 WL 191576, at *3.
20. Id. at *12, *25, and *27.
21. See Solomon, supra note 18.
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other corporate resources on adjudicating the dispute. The "fairness"
factor affects firm value because if meritorious claims are, or are
expected to be, vindicated, management is more likely to adhere to its
fiduciary duties. This disciplining effect reduces the firm's agency
costs-that is, the degree to which management acts for its own
benefit rather than that of the corporation-and concomitantly
increases the firm's value.22 In contrast, the success of an
unmeritorious claim does nothing to reduce agency costs and instead
depletes corporate assets or opportunities-for example through
increased director-and-officer insurance premiums or management
distraction.2 3 The "efficiency" factor affects firm value because
litigation costs, and the time and resources devoted to litigation use up
corporate assets and thwart corporate opportunities. These factors are
not independent of each other in affecting firm value: they often offset
one another because efficiently resolving a claim (such as through a
summary dismissal process) can mean that factually meritorious
claims go without vindication.
24
The potential for bringing meritorious intracorporate claims
helps discipline management o act in the firm's best interest.2 ' This
disciplining reduces the firm's agency costs, which in turn leads to
increased firm value.26 Firms are best off if meritorious intracorporate
claims are: (1) vindicated (because management is disciplined) and (2)
22. See James D. Cox, Compensation, Deterrence, and the Market as
Boundaries for Derivative Suit Procedures, 52 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 745, 746 (1984)
("Corporations respond to managers' tendency to misbehave with a combination of
contracting arrangements, monitoring, and signaling. These devices not only curb
managers' more extreme tendencies, but also reduce the firm[]'s cost of capital and
increase its value."). This article addresses directors and officers as both having a
role to play in imposing, or mitigating, agency costs.
23. Richard Squire, How Collective Settlements Camouflage the Costs of
Shareholder Lawsuits, 62 DUKE L.J. 1, 6 (2012) ("Each of the last four [settlement-
related] costs drives up D&O insurance premiums, which shareholders ultimately
pay.").
24. See Glenn S. Koppel, Toward a New Federalism in State Civil Justice:
Developing a Uniform Code of State Civil Procedure, 58 VAND. L. REv. 1167, 1206
(2005) ("[I]n balancing the tension between the competing procedural goals of
judicial efficiency (e.g., speed and low cost) and fairness (e.g., accuracy in
factfinding in individual cases), empirical data can inform rulemakers about whether
and to what extent a proposed rule change will reduce cost and delay and at what
cost to fairness.").
25. Cf Terry M. Moe, The New Economics of Organization, 28 AM. J. POL.
ScI. 739, 756 (1984) ("[T]here is no guarantee that the agent, once hired, will in fact
choose to pursue the principal's best interests or to do so efficiently. The agent has
his own interests at heart .... ").
26. See generally Cox, supra note 22.
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vindicated quickly (because litigation expense will be lower). Firms
are also best off if unmeritorious claims are: (1) defeated (because they
offer no potential to discipline management) and (2) defeated quickly
(again, to avoid litigation expense). In other words, firm value is
promoted when there are fair outcomes (when meritorious claims are
vindicated, and unmeritorious claims are defeated) and when claims
are resolved efficiently.
A firm can exercise control over these fairness and efficiency
factors and their interplay-and thus affect its value-by calibrating
the procedures that govern its intracorporate disputes. Civil procedure
is thus a lever of firm value. And an effective way for firms to leverage
procedure to affect their value is to adopt APs. But risks associated
with these provisions mean that lAPs also have the potential to harm
shareholders. This article confronts these risks and shows that
intracorporate arbitration can serve shareholders' fundamental interest
in increasing firm value.27 That outcome is most likely to be achieved
when a firm adopts an IAP that makes a credible commitment to a
credible arbitral institution. That is, firms must commit themselves to
exogenous, independent adjudication of their intracorporate disputes.
In turn, a credible arbitral institution makes a set of commitments to
its stakeholders, as well as to the public interest: a commitment to
independence, a commitment o law, and a commitment o process.
As CommonWealth REIT's management showed, for better or
worse, an IAP is a vehicle by which companies may calibrate away
from the default civil procedures offered by state or federal courts.
And, as the contrast between Carlyle's thwarted IPO plans and the
shifting rhetoric from the SEC shows, this is an option that has a
clearer path to broad adoption than before. Given the potential spread
of lAPs among public firms, the market needs a framework for
evaluating whether an LAP will increase, rather than decrease, firm
value.
28
27. This assumption that shareholders' fundamental interest is in seeing the
value of their shares increase is not universally held. See Einer Elhauge, Sacrificing
Corporate Profits in the Public Interest, 80 NYU L. REV. 733, 763 (2005)
(acknowledging the "canonical" view that corporate managers must maximize
profits, but observing that positive law does not state that rule); see also PRINCIPLES
OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS & RECOMMENDATIONS § 2.01(b)(2)-(3)
and cmt. d. (Am. Law Inst. 2017) (providing that, like natural persons, corporations
must follow the law and may act in accordance with ethical and charitable
considerations).
28. Very few public companies have IAPs, and so this article approaches the
value effects from their adoption in mostly general terms. As more firms adopt LAPs,
however, the effects of their adoption on share prices can be identified through
[Vol. 3 8:1
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This article provides that framework by explaining how IAPs
should work in order to effect higher firm value. Part I lays out the
framework for intracorporate arbitration, which derives from an
intersection of state corporate law, conflict-of-laws principles, and the
Federal Arbitration Act (FAA). Part II describes the benefit-cost
analysis firms must undertake when deciding whether to adopt IAPs.
In deconstructing that analysis into its component pieces, Part II
confronts key governance risks raised by IAPs and potential public-
policy-based barriers to their adoption. Drawing from Part II's
analysis, Part IH then demonstrates a normative, institutional model
for how value-enhancing LAPs should work. The article closes with a
view toward the work that will be needed to apply its institutional
model to real-world governance.
I. THE FRAMEWORK FOR INTRACORPORATE ARBITRATION
When a corporation adds an IAP to its charter or bylaws, it
obliges its officers, directors, and shareholders to submit disputes over
the firm's internal affairs to arbitration, rather than to public courts.
This practice's framework follows from three sources: state corporate
law, conflict-of-laws principles, and the FAA. This Part lays that
framework out and explains that because corporate charters and
bylaws are contractual, and because the FAA protects the enforcement
of contracts to arbitrate, LAPs should be expected to receive the same
treatment as any other contract.
29
To be sure, the framework outlined in this Part is up for
debate.30 Professor Ann Lipton, for example, has argued persuasively
that corporate bylaws are distinguishable from ordinary bilateral
contracts in which parties manifest their assent o terms, and that at the
least they are not the kind of contract that falls within the remit, or
econometric methods. This empirical work will be important to showing what effect
LAPs have, and, more importantly, what IAP designs, if any, are most associated
with increased value.
29. This point is a general one. The FAA covers "maritime transactions" and
"commercial" contracts. The latter is a particularly broad category, but it does not
encompass every type of contract. See infra note 35 and accompanying text.
30. But see 4 JAMES D. Cox & THOMAS LEE HAZEN, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF
CORPORATIONS § 15:23 (3d ed. 2011) ("The corporation-as-contract theory supports
other board-adopted bylaw initiatives such as requiring shareholder suits to be
subject to binding arbitration.").
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competence, of FAA arbitral procedures.31 As Part II.C shows, there
remain considerable questions whether LAPs may be adopted, how the
FAA does or does not apply to them, and under what circumstances
they may be enforced. Yet, as Part II discusses,32 the weight of both
corporate-law and FAA precedent is moving in favor of intracorporate
arbitration. As Professor Stephen Ware has observed, rather
pragmatically, "[a]dhesion contracts are contracts, because most of
their terms are routinely enforced by courts throughout the country.,
33
That is, adhesive IAPs are unlikely to fare particularly worse than
other adhesive contracts when it comes time for enforcement. If that
is how these questions will likely be answered, then, the question is
what intracorporate arbitration should look like.34 In getting there, this
and the next Part offer best impressions of how, doctrinally and
practically, that question will come to demand a concrete response.
This framework, at a high level, goes as follows: (i) disputes
over the internal affairs of a corporation will be resolved under the
laws of the chartering state regardless what forum hears the dispute;
(ii) these disputes are controlled by a corporation's charter and bylaws,
which are contractual between the corporation and its officers,
directors, and shareholders; (iii) these binding forum-selection
provisions in charters and bylaws-of which LAPs are a subset-may
be adopted unilaterally by a board of directors, or by a shareholder
vote; (iv) the contracts are then applied as "commercial" contracts
under the FAA;35 (v) and, most importantly, the contractual rights to
enforce IAPs are protected by the FAA, meaning that arbitration of
intracorporate disputes i mandated.
31. See generally Ann M. Lipton, Manufactured Consent: The Problem of
Arbitration Clauses in Corporate Charters and Bylaws, 104 GEO. L.J. 583, 596-97
(2016).
32. See infra note 38. A former justice of the Delaware Supreme Court, for
example, explained why this principle led to the vindication of forum-selection
bylaws in that state: "Because corporate bylaws are merely contractual agreements
between the corporation, its directors, and the stockholders, the Court of Chancery
concluded.., that forum-selection bylaws are presumptively valid." Henry DuPont
Ridgely, The Emerging Role of Bylaws in Corporate Governance, 68 SMU L. REV.
317, 323 (2015).
33. Stephen J. Ware, The Politics of Arbitration Law and Centrist Proposals
for Reform, 53 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 711, 716 (2016).
34. See also Verity Winship, Shareholder Litigation by Contract, 96 B.U. L.
REV. 485, 506-07 (2016) ("Furthermore, Delaware's acceptance of forum selection
clauses provided a way to ensure that other procedural provisions are enforced.").
35. 9 U.S.C. § 1 (1947).
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In outlining this framework, Section A briefly introduces the
internal-affairs doctrine and the contractarian approach to corporate
governance, including the conflict-of-laws principles applicable to
intracorporate disputes. Section B describes the FAA as establishing a
robust national pro-arbitration policy, would likely apply as a matter
of course to LAps. 3 6 This policy enforces agreements to arbitrate in the
face of traditional state hostility to arbitration, which would include
state public-policy opposition to intracorporate arbitration.
A. The Internal-Affairs Doctrine and Corporate
Governance
1. Internal Affairs and Contractarian Corporate
Governance
The internal affairs of a corporation-the relationship between
it and its officers, directors, and shareholders in their roles as such-
are governed by a hierarchy of public and private law.37 Heading this
hierarchy is the substantive corporate law of the firm's chartering
jurisdiction, followed by the firm's charter and then its bylaws. These
two governing documents are the contractual foundation of the firm's
corporate governance.38 Under this contractarian approach, the charter
36. See Moses. H. Cone Mem. Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24
(1983) ("[Q]uestions of arbitrability must be addressed with a healthy regard for the
federal policy favoring arbitration."); but see also Hiro N. Aragaki, Arbitration's
Suspect Status, 159 U. PA. L. REv. 1233, 1266-67 (2011) (arguing that the Supreme
Court's pro-arbitration jurisprudence springs from "the service of reversing... anti-
arbitration hostility" and not from "prioritiz[ing] arbitration over other forms of
dispute resolution.").
37. See Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624,645 (1982) ("[I]ntemal affairs [are
those] matters peculiar to the relationships among or between the corporation and
its current officers, directors, and shareholders .... "). Examples of matters that are
a part of a corporation's intemal affairs include those that "involve primarily a
corporation's relationship to its shareholders includ[ing] steps taken in the course of
the original incorporation, the election or appointment of directors and officers, the
adoption of by-laws, the issuance of corporate shares, preemptive rights, the holding
of directors' and shareholders' meetings, methods of voting including any
requirement for cumulative voting, shareholders' rights to examine corporate
records, charter and by-law amendments, mergers, consolidations and
reorganizations and the reclassification of shares." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONFLICT OF LAWS § 302 cmt. a (1971).
38. See, e.g., Centaur Partners, IV v. Nat'l Intergroup, Inc., 582 A.2d 923, 928
(Del. 1990) ("Corporate charters and by-laws are contracts among the shareholders
of a corporation and the general rules of contract interpretation are held to apply.");
Airgas, Inc. v. Air Prods. & Chems., Inc., 8 A.3d 1182, 1188 (Del. 2010) (holding
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and bylaws are a private agreement defining the relative rights and
responsibilities of officers, directors, and shareholders in the
management and control of the firm. Importantly, this corporate-
governance contract generally does not vest rights; that is, contractual
rights that cannot be altered without a shareholder's consent.39 Instead,
inherent in this governance contract is that its terms may be amended,
even without the individual consent of shareholders (who are
constructively on notice of this possibility when they acquire their
shares).40
A corporation's charter and bylaws may be amended by a
shareholder vote. State corporate statutes also typically empower a
corporation's board of directors to unilaterally amend its bylaws, so
long as the firm's charter affirmatively permits it to do so.4 1 This
power gives boards of directors significant flexibility in designing the
governance for their firms. Examples of such unilateral amendments
include setting the size of the board of directors itself, mandating
advance notice of shareholder proposals, or-as this article
discusses-adopting an LAP. Whatever their topic, these amendments
too are contractually binding on shareholders, present and future.
4 2
that bylaws are "contracts among a corporation's shareholders"); Garey v. St. Joe
Min. Co., 91 P. 369, 374 (Utah 1907) ("[T]he corporate charter is a dual contract-
one between the state and the corporation and its stockholders, the other between the
corporation and its stockholders .... ").
39. See Cox & HAZEN, supra note 30, at § 25:4 ("In Delaware, the vested-
rights doctrine is generally recognized as a dead letter, and no contemporary decision
is likely to be resolved on this basis.").
40. See Taylor v. Hinkle, 200 S.W.3d 387 (Ark. 2004) ("[T]he trial court
correctly interpreted [an Arkansas corporation's bylaws] to allow amendment of the
bylaws by either the stockholders or the directors."); Kidsco, Inc. v. Dinsmore, 674
A.2d 483, 492 (Del. Ch. 1995) ("[A]lthough the by-laws are a contract between the
corporation and its stockholders.., the contract was subject to the board's power to
amend the by-laws unilaterally.").
41. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 109 ("[A]ny corporation may, in its
certificate of incorporation, confer the power to adopt, amend or repeal bylaws upon
the directors .. . ."); MD CODE ANN., CORPs. & ASSN'S § 2-109 ("[T]he power to
adopt, alter, and repeal the bylaws of the corporation is vested in the stockholders
except to the extent that the charter or bylaws vest it in the board of directors.");
MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 10.20(b) (Am. Bar Ass'n 2003) (setting the board's
authority to amend the bylaws as a default rule).
42. See Boilermakers Local 154 Ret. Fund v. Chevron Corp., 73 A.3d 934, 956
(Del. Ch. 2013) (explaining that the argument "that board-adopted bylaws are not
like other contracts because they lack the stockholders' assent-rests on a failure to
appreciate the contractual framework established by the [Delaware General




A corporation's board of directors has the authority to manage
its day-to-day business. Shareholders, however, hold three primary
powers to discipline management: the power to vote, the power to sell,
and the power to sue.43 This article focuses on that final power and its
implications for firm value.
Shareholders sue over a firm's internal affairs in large part to
discipline its officers and directors.44 The substantive corporate law of
a firm's chartering state governs intracorporate disputes, which might
involve, for example, derivative suits alleging breaches of fiduciary
duty,45 exercising statutory shareholder rights, or challenging
violations of state law or the corporation's charter or bylaws.46 This
43. J.A. LIVINGSTON, THE AMERICAN STOCKHOLDER 40-41 (1958)
(identifying voting, selling, and suing as shareholders' primary powers); see also
Robert B. Thompson, Preemption and Federalism in Corporate Governance:
Protecting Shareholder Rights to Vote, Sell, and Sue, 62 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS.
215, 216 (2000) ("Under corporate law in all states, directors manage the business
and affairs of the corporation. Shareholders have only a limited role: They can vote,
sell, or sue.").
44. Intracorporate disputes do not include claims arising purely under federal
securities law, although those claims may coincide with intracorporate disputes, and
some commentators have conflated the two. See Ann M. Lipton, Manufactured
Consent: The Problem of Arbitration Clauses in Corporate Charters and Bylaws,
104 GEO. L.J. 583, 596-97 (2016) ("Many commentators have advocated using
charters and bylaws to restrict securities claims (state and federal) and state law
corporate governance claims, as a mechanism for curbing frivolous litigation,
without distinguishing between the two."). Being a corporation's shareholder is
distinct from being a purchaser or seller of its securities, even though the first tends
to follow from the second. See id. at 598. This article, however, focuses on
intracorporate disputes, and thus far the weight of authority is that IAPs could not
apply to federal securities claims. See Sciabacucchi v. Salzberg, C.A. No. 2017-
0931-JTL, 2018 WL 6719718, at *18 (Del. Ch. Dec. 19, 2018) ("[Charter or bylaw
forum-selection provisions that] purport to regulate the forum in which parties
external to the corporation (purchasers of securities) can sue under a body of law
external to the corporate contract (the 1933 Act) [are] ineffective."); see also
Stephen M. Bainbridge, Fee-Shifting: Delaware's Self-Inflicted Wound, 40 DEL. J.
CORP. L. 851, 859 (2016) (observing a "substantial likelihood" that fee-shifting
bylaws applicable to federal securities claims would be preempted by federal law).
45. See Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 538 (1970) ("The corporation is a
necessary party to the action .... Although named a defendant, it is the real party in
interest, the stockholder being at best the nominal plaintiff. The proceeds of the
action belong to the corporation and it is bound by the result of the suit.").
46. This article generally takes for granted that the plaintiffs in an
intracorporate dispute will be shareholders. Compared to officers and directors,
shareholders are "outsiders" and so most governance-related litigation will be
shareholder-initiated. However, it applies to intracorporate disputes brought by
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tool works ex ante in disciplining management to adhere to its
fiduciary duties, as the potential for litigation incents management o
avoid acts or omissions that could lead to an intracorporate dispute.
Suits also provide shareholders with an ex post enforcement
mechanism when management violates its fiduciary duties.
The internal-affairs doctrine applies across state lines.47 A
court hearing an intracorporate dispute related to a foreign corporation
will apply the chartering state's substantive corporate law and its own
procedural law.48 This means that a suit by shareholders of a firm
incorporated in New York may be heard in Maryland and that the court
in Maryland will apply the corporate law of New York.49 The ability
of shareholders to pursue intracorporate claims outside the chartering
state gives rise, however, to the potential for similar or identical claims
being brought in multiple jurisdictions. Multi-fora litigation subjects
common claims and facts to the jurisdiction of multiple courts, risking
inconsistent adjudications as well as conflicts over their preclusive
effects.5° Meanwhile, as an economic concern, multi-fora litigation
impedes the ability of firms to pursue business opportunities
(particularly in the M&A context) and, in any case, compounds legal
fees and other litigation-related costs.
51
directors and officers, as well. See, e.g., Pearson v. Exide Corp., 157 F. Supp. 2d 429
(E.D. Pa. 2001) (former officer suing under an indemnification bylaw for the
advancement of litigation expenses); Moran v. Household Int'l, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346
(Del. 1985) (dissenting director challenging the adoption of a shareholder rights
plan).
47. See IMO Daniel Kroeber Dynasty Trust, 98 A.3d 924, 939 (Del. Ch. 2014)
("When a Delaware state statute assigns exclusive jurisdiction to a particular
Delaware court, the statute is allocating jurisdiction among the Delaware courts. The
state is not making a claim against the world that no court outside of Delaware can
exercise jurisdiction over that type of case."); In re IBP, Inc. S'holders Litig., No.
18373, 2001 WL 406292, at *9 n.21 (Del. Ch. Apr. 18, 2001) ("Delaware courts
have not hesitated to enforce forum selection clauses that operate to divest the courts
of this State of the power they would otherwise have to hear a dispute."); see also
infra note 54.
48. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS § 313 cmt. e ("Even when a court
entertains a suit involving the internal affairs of a foreign corporation, it will ...
usually apply the local law of the state of incorporation in arriving at the ultimate
decision of the case.").
49. Id.
50. See Cal. State Teachers' Ret. Sys. v. Alvarez, 175 A.3d 86 (Table) (Del.
2017) (en banc) (holding that the dismissal by an Arkansas court of a derivative suit
involving a Delaware corporation precluded a similar action from being brought in
Delaware by new plaintiffs).
51. But see Bryce Cullinane, Unilateral Forum Selection Clauses in Corporate
Bylaws: A Synopsis of the Debate, 7 J. Bus. ENTREPRENEuRsHIP & L., 485, 493-94
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But corporations may avoid multi-fora litigation by adopting
forum-selection bylaws, whether by shareholder vote or unilaterally
through board action.52 Forum-selection bylaws restrict intracorporate
disputes to a designated forum. For example, a forum selection clause
could restrict litigation of intracorporate disputes to courts in the
firm's chartering or headquarters state. These bylaws bind
shareholders as part of the corporate-governance contract, serving to
curtail multi-fora litigation and its attendant costs.53 They may also
result in other salutary, forum-specific effects. For example, although
the same substantive law that governs a given corporation's internal
affairs applies regardless the forum, forum-selection bylaws allow
firms to choose, as a matter of private ordering, what local procedural
law will apply or what types of judges will adjudicate their
intracorporate disputes. This power to choose might matter, for
example, if a firm decides between one state that quickly resolves civil
litigation versus one with a slow docket, or one state with judges who
are corporate-law experts versus one in which judges rarely hear such
disputes.54
B. The Federal Arbitration Act in the Intracorporate
Context
Arbitration agreements provide for a specialized form of forum
selection in which parties submit disputes to private arbitrators, rather
than to public courts.55 As a means of dispute resolution, arbitration
(2014) ("Plaintiffs argue that this tactic levels the playing field between corporate
defendants and shareholder plaintiffs. They assert that without this opportunity,
litigation will be inherently tipped in favor of defendants, especially when suits must
be litigated in corporation-friendly Delaware.").
52. In re Revlon, Inc. S'holders Litig., 990 A.2d. 940, 960 (Del. Ch. 2010)
("[I]f boards of directors and stockholders believe that a particular forum would
provide an efficient and value-promoting locus for dispute resolution, then
corporations are free to respond with charter provisions selecting an exclusive forum
for intra-entity disputes.").
53. See generally Atlantic Marine Constr. Co., Inc. v. U.S. Dist. Ct., 134 S. Ct.
568 (2013) (reaffirming the presumptive enforceability of forum-selection clauses).
54. See Baker v. Impact Holding, Inc., No. 4960-VCP, 2010 WL 1931032, at
*2 (Del. Ch. May 13, 2010) ("Delaware does not have an overarching public policy
that prevents the stockholders of Delaware corporations from agreeing to exclusive
foreign jurisdiction of any matter involving the internal affairs of [Delaware
corporations].").
55. Stephen J. Ware, Default Rules from Mandatory Rules: Privatizing Law
Through Arbitration, 83 MINN. L. REV. 703, 717 (1999) ("The [Supreme] Court
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historically faced hostility from public authorities5 6 that Congress
enacted the FAA to countermand.57 In doing so, Congress effected a
policy favoring the private-ordering and efficiency opportunities
offered by arbitral dispute resolution. The FAA sets a national policy
in favor of enforcing contracts "involving commerce" that commit
disputes arising under them to arbitration.5 8 Contracts "involving
commerce" are contracts that fall under the Commerce Clause's broad
scope,59 and the FAA has been interpreted broadly, encompassing
consumer-related activities like processing credit-card payments or
establishing cellular-phone service.
60
The FAA applies equally to federal and state courts and
preempts state law that prohibits or discriminates against arbitration.61
conceives of arbitration clauses as forum-selection clauses, but not as choice-of-law
clauses.").
56. See H.R. Rep. No. 68-96 at 1 (1924) ("[T]he need for the [FAA] arises from
... the jealousy of the English courts for their own jurisdiction.... The jealousy
survived for so lon[g] a period that the principle became firmly embedded in the
English common law and was adopted with it by the American courts. The courts
have felt that the precedent was too strongly fixed to be overturned without
legislative enactment ... ."); but see Hiro N. Aragaki, Equal Opportunity for
Arbitration, 58 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 1189, 1194 n.29 (2011) ("The text of the FAA is
simply too indeterminate, and the congressional record leading to its enactment too
sparse, to draw any firm conclusions about the statute's original meaning. What is
incontrovertible, however, is that courts routinely deploy antidiscrimination rhetoric
to justify the FAA's displacement of state law.").
57. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 16 (1984) ("The problems
Congress faced were therefore twofold: the old common law hostility toward
arbitration, and the failure of state arbitration statutes to mandate enforcement of
arbitration agreements."); see also id. at 12 ("In creating a substantive rule
applicable in state as well as federal courts, Congress intended to foreclose state
legislative attempts to undercut the enforceability of arbitration agreements.").
58. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1947) ("A written provision in ... a contract evidencing a
transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter
arising out of such contract or transaction ... shall be valid, irrevocable, and
enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation
of any contract.").
59. See, e.g., Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos., Inc. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 273-
74 (1995) ("After examining the [FAA's] language, background, and structure, we
conclude that the word 'involving' is broad and is indeed the functional equivalent
of 'affecting."'); Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 490 (1987) (holding that the FAA
"embodies Congress' intent to provide for the enforcement of arbitration agreements
within the full reach of the Commerce Clause").
60. See Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant, 570 U.S. 228 (2013)
(credit-card payment processing); AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S.
333 (2011) (cellular-phone service).
61. Southland, 465 U.S. at 16 ("[T]he substantive law the [FAA] created was
applicable in state and federal court.").
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Federal law exception for contracts from FAA enforcement, but only
when Congress expressly provides for such a carve-out.62 There are,
however, limits to FAA enforcement: under its savings clause, an
arbitration agreement is revocable "upon such grounds as exist at law
or in equity for the revocation of any contract.'' 63 This clause thus sets
arbitration agreements on the "same footing" as any other contract,
while protecting them from defenses that are not applicable to
contracts generally.
64
IAPs intersect with the FAA because under the contractarian
approach to corporate governance, a firm's charter and bylaws are
contractual between its management and shareholders (in those
capacities).65 Thus, unilateral bylaws amendments adopted by boards
of directors are part of the corporate-governance bargain that binds
shareholders.66 As a matter of contract formation, shareholders are
constructively on notice of this possibility when they acquire their
shares, and they have an opportunity to review the firm's charter and
bylaws before doing so.67 The FAA also countenances the imposition
of mandatory arbitration provisions when a contract-even an
adhesive one-allows one party to make unilateral amendments.
68
Taken together, the framework for intracorporate arbitration
emerges. If corporate charters and bylaws are contractual, then their
inclusion of a mandatory arbitration provision should be expected to
be treated like any other arbitration agreement. As Part II discusses
more fully, intracorporate arbitration remains unsettled in terms of its
underlying doctrine, policy, and market considerations. This Part
outlines, however, that the intersection of state corporate law, conflict-
of-laws principles, and the FAA makes intracorporate arbitration
available to firms. As the remainder of this article explains, the
62. Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 226 (1987)
("Like any statutory directive, the Arbitration Act's mandate may be overridden by
a contrary congressional command.").
63. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1947).
64. Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 511 (1974).
65. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
66. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
67. Public companies must disclose bylaws amendments on Form 8-K within
four business days of adoption, thus providing shareholders with constructive notice
of the amended corporate contract. SEC Current Report on Form 8-K, Gen.
Instruction B (requiring filing within four business days); SEC Regulation S-K, 17
C.F.R. § 229.601(b)(3)(ii) (requiring the amended charter or bylaws to be exhibited
as Item 5.03(a) on a Form 8-K).
68. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S 333 (2011).
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decision whether to adopt an LAP stands to affect a firm's value in a
significant way, for better or for worse.
II. THE ADOPTION OF INTRACORPORATE ARBITRATION
PROVISIONS
As Part I lays out, firms generally can adopt IAPs, but that
doesn't mean they will or should. This article's project is to describe
what intracorporate arbitration should look like for firms whose
adoption of them is motivated by a desire to increase firm value.
Professor Barbara Black has wryly noted that for decades,
shareholder-corporate arbitration has been an "idea whose time has
come."69 Indeed, although hundreds of forum-selection provisions
have been adopted in corporate governing documents, there have been
very few IAPs.70 This Part explains why. Section A outlines criticisms
of adhesive arbitration agreements and urges that these criticisms are
important for understanding lAP adoption and, ultimately, for
designing institutions that offer firm-value-enhancing approaches to
intracorporate disputes. Section B models the decisional analysis
surrounding IAP adoption and its impact on firm value. Section C
addresses legal and policy limits and barriers to adoption.
A. Learning from the Criticism ofAdhesive Arbitration
Agreements
The use of arbitration agreements negotiated between
sophisticated commercial parties is uncontroversial.71  These
agreements exemplify efficient private ordering and free up the
69. Barbara Black, Arbitration of Investors' Claims Against Issuers: An Idea
Whose Time Has Come?, 75 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 107 (2012).
70. Joseph A. Grundfest & Kristen A. Savelle, The Brouhaha Over Intra-
Corporate Forum Selection Provisions: A Legal, Economic, and Political Analysis,
68 Bus. LAW. 325, 326 (2013); Roberta Romano & Sarath Sanga, The Private
Ordering Solution to Multiforum Shareholder Litigation, at 2 (ECGI Working Paper
Series in Law No. 295, 2015) (746 forum-selection-clause adoptions by U.S. public
companies as of mid-2014).
71. Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, The Unconscionability Game: Strategic Judging
and the Evolution of Federal Arbitration Law, 83 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1420, 1489 (2008)
("[T]here is little opposition today to arbitration between sophisticated commercial
parties."); cf The Arbitration Fairness Act of 2017, § 2(1), H. 1374, 115th Cong.,
which proposes a congressional finding that when it was enacted, the FAA "was
intended to apply to disputes between commercial entities of generally similar
sophistication and bargaining power."
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dockets of our overworked civil-justice systems.72 That consensus
view does not hold, however, for arbitration agreements whose parties
are not all sophisticated or who have substantially different levels of
negotiating power. In the context of adhesive arbitration agreements,
commentators have criticized agreements drafted by dominant parties
(e.g., employers, phone carriers, or banks) as leaving non-dominant
parties (e.g., employees or customers) with deficient resort compared
to what is available in public courts.73 Although corporate bylaws are
a different type of contract than employment or consumer agreements,
the criticism of adhesive arbitration agreements fairly applies to IAPs,
too.74 Whatever their implications in non-corporate contexts, in the
intracorporate context, these criticisms must be taken seriously. If
LAPs are to be a private-ordering approach to enhancing firm value,
the problems alleged to apply to them must be mitigated, including
through how they are designed. More, as a matter of LAP adoption,
these criticisms will, and do, implicitly shape the perceptions of the
market and regulators. Widespread IAP adoption will not happen until
market stakeholders have confidence that standard criticisms of
72. See Hanes Corp. v. Millard, 531 F.2d 585, 598 (D.C. Cir. 1976),
superseded by statute on other grounds, as recognized in Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp.
v. Consol. Rail. Corp., 892 F.d 1066, 1071 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (recognizing that
arbitration should be favored because it "eases court congestion"); see also
Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 450 U.S. 728, 752-53 (1981)
(Burger, C.J., dissenting) ("The Court seems unaware that people's patience with
the judicial process is wearing thin.... This Court ought not be oblivious to
desperately needed changes to keep the federal courts from being inundated with
disputes of a kind that can be handled more swiftly and more cheaply by other
methods.").
73. David S. Schwartz, Enforcing Small Print to Protect Big Business:
Employee and Consumer Rights Claims in an Age of Compelled Arbitration, WIS.
L. REV. 33, 36 (1997) ("The Supreme Court has created a monster.... Given [its]
blessing in the name of a 'national policy favoring arbitration,' adhesive pre-dispute
arbitration clauses should expand beyond their current strongholds in consumer
contracts in health insurance, banking and securities investing to other areas of the
economy and society."); Jean R. Sternlight, Panacea or Corporate Tool?:
Debunking the Supreme Court's Preference for Binding Arbitration, 74 WASH. U.
L.Q. 637, 676 (1996) ("[E]ven a consumer who reads the [arbitration] clause might
well lack the legal sophistication to understand its significance, perhaps not
recognizing that appeals from arbitration are virtually unwinnable and that little or
no discovery may be made available in an arbitration proceeding.").
74. Cf Winship, supra note 34, at 521-22 ("The use of litigation provisions in
corporate organizational documents implicates deep disagreement about the efficacy
and purposes of shareholder litigation, as well as polarized views of the appropriate
role of the plaintiffs' bar.").
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adhesive arbitration agreements have been overcome in the
intracorporate context.
The criticisms of adhesive arbitration agreements reveal two
core problems relevant to LAPs:
1. The Procedural Problem
The first problem is the procedural problem, in which an
arbitration agreement offers different-and usually more limited-
procedural rights to parties than would be enjoyed under federal or
state civil procedure. These arbitral procedures might include shorter
statutes of limitations, heightened pleading standards, non-
appealability, reduced discovery opportunities, strict evidentiary
standards, or a prohibition on class actions. The Supreme Court's FAA
jurisprudence has treated diminished procedures as streamlined
procedures-features, not bugs-what arbitration is all about.
Litigants objecting to the enforcement of such agreements have
argued, unsuccessfully, that this approach to procedure makes it
difficult or infeasible to vindicate meritorious legal claims.75 Scholars
and state courts have echoed these concerns, noting that restricted
arbitral procedures will result in more defendant wins than would
occur in judicial fora and that, conveniently, the powerful players that
draft these agreements happen to be mostly the defendants in cases
brought under them.
One aspect of this problem may give both management and
shareholders pause. Arbitration is typically final (other than on the
narrow grounds the FAA provides for vacating awards).76 The lack of
an appeals process means that intracorporate disputes-which may
affect enormous sums of shareholder wealth-lack an outlet for error
correction. Non-appealability, coupled with streamlined, less formal
procedures, increases the risk of erroneous decisions. The economy
achieved by non-appealable arbitration is a plus in commercial or
consumer cases, but it is likely inappropriate for complex, high-stakes
intracorporate disputes.77
75. That is not to say that the limitations listed here are necessarily
inappropriate to the intracorporate context. But see Winship, supra note 34, at 522
("[P]arties should not be allowed to circumvent mandatory substantive law by
shaping procedure, particularly where one party dictates the contractual terms. If a
party cannot contract around a substantive obligation, then the party should not be
able to eliminate it by disabling enforcement.").
76. See generally infra notes 163 and 184.
77. See infra notes 78 and 157 (discussing California's Discover Bank rule).
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2. The Repeat-Player Problem
The second problem is the repeat-playerproblem, in which the
party that drafts an adhesive arbitration agreement will always be a
party to disputes under the form, while its counterparties will be one-
off players. For example, a telecommunications carrier may have
hundreds of thousands of customers who have signed a form service
agreement. The carrier will typically be the defendant in disputes
under the form, whereas individual customers will be plaintiffs who
are only involved in their own personal disputes with the carrier.
78
This imbalance in turn incents the drafter to ensure it has a strong hand
in choosing the arbitrator (versus the mutually negotiated arbitrator-
selection provisions often found in commercial agreements).79
Selected arbitrators thus face implicit pressure in each adjudication to
find for the drafter, because if it loses too often with Arbitrator A, it
may as well start selecting Arbitrator B.80
Although the nature of intracorporate claims means that firms
will face fewer of them than, say, a carrier would face service disputes
with its customers, repeat-player effects may still emerge in the
intracorporate context.81 For example, if Corporation Y selects Jane, a
corporate lawyer, as arbitrator, Jane may feel pressure to lean toward
management in hopes that she will be selected for the next arbitration.
This repeat-player problem arises at both the firm and the market level.
Jane may not have any inclination to be selected by Corporation X
again as an arbitrator or subsequently to be hired by it for legal
78. See Szetela v. Discover Bank, 97 Cal. App. 4th. 1094, 1101 (2002)
(describing a mutual class-action waiver in a credit-card agreement as one-sided
because "it is difficult to envision the circumstances under which the provision
might negatively impact [the bank], because credit card companies typically do not
sue their customers in class action lawsuits.").
79. See Bruhl, supra note 71.
80. For example, disputes between broker-dealers and their customers are
almost always heard by arbitral panels organized by the Financial Industry
Regulatory Authority (FINRA). FINRA recognizes that positional conflicts can arise
when attorneys who work on behalf of the industry hear arbitrations involving it,
even when they have no direct conflict. To mitigate this problem, it deems attorneys
who practice on behalf of or in proximity to financial-industry clients as "non-public
arbitrators" and puts limits on their panel membership. See FINRA Manual §§
12100(y), 12402(a), 12403(a)(1) (2017).
81. But see Paul Weitzel, The End of Shareholder Litigation? Allowing
Shareholders to Customize Enforcement Through Arbitration Provisions in
Charters and Bylaws, BYU L. REv. 65, 92 (2013) (noting that in shareholder-
litigation context, shareholders can be repeat players, too, and that the plaintiffs'
firms that represent shareholders certainly are).
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services. But then, if she wants to serve as an arbitrator for other firms'
disputes, or at least to be retained for their other legal matters, she has
an incentive to maintain a reputation for being favorable toward
management in intracorporate cases. Otherwise, Corporations Y and
Z may not call her when they are looking to select an arbitrator.82 Even
assuming that industry arbitrators face no conflict of interest, some
will consistently have a pro-management bent, and in a world in which
firms have a hand in picking arbitrators, those are the ones who will
be in demand. 83
These problems affect more than after-the-fact vindication of
intracorporate claims if, say, directors breach their fiduciary duties.
Officers and directors act under the shadow of litigation: the risk of
intracorporate litigation has an ex ante disciplining effect on
84management. If an LAP does materially reduce the likelihood that
intracorporate claims are successful, this shadow will recede along
with its ex ante disciplining effect. Under this view, merely adding an
LAP to bylaws could increase agency costs and thus diminish firm
value, because it would cause management o perceive itself as less
constrained by a major vehicle of shareholder power. 85 Without this
check, management may begin to act increasingly in its own interest,
rather than in the larger interest of the firm.
82. This is also a criticism of the Delaware judiciary, so the concern is not
unique to arbitral fora. See Lynn M. LoPucki, Delaware's Fall: The Arbitration
Bylaws Scenario, in CAN DELAWARE BE DETHRONED?: EVALUATING DELAWARE'S
DOMINANCE OF CORPORATE LAW 35 (Stephen Bainbridge et al. eds., 2018).
83. See Stephen J. Choi, Jill E. Fisch, and A.C. Pritchard, The Influence of
Arbitrator Background and Representation on Arbitration Outcomes, VA. L. & BUS.
REV. 43, 86 (2014) (regression analysis showing that arbitrators with securities-
industry experience are likelier to make smaller awards in FINRA securities
arbitration).
84. Examples of behavior that breaches fiduciary duties include colluding to
improperly raise executive compensation, engaging in conflicted transactions, and
making material misstatements or omissions in shareholder disclosures surrounding
voting matters. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Rescuing the Private Attorney General: Why
The Model of Lawyer as Bounty Hunter is Not Working, 42 MD. L. REV. 215, 218
(1983) ("The conventional theory of the private attorney general stresses that the
role of private litigation is not simply to secure compensation for victims, but is at
least equally to generate deterrence, principally by multiplying the total resources
committed to the detection and prosecution of the prohibited behavior.").
85. See Roberta Romano, Answering the Wrong Question: The Tenuous Case
for Mandatory Corporate Laws, 89 COLuM. L. REV. 1599, 1613-14 (1989)
(observing that "changes in corporate structure are priced" and discussing the
potential for charter amendments to reduce share prices).
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The retort to these problems is: economic actors made these
agreements and they are within the bounds of the FAA, so let the
equities fall where they may. Indeed, such a retort well sums up the
Supreme Court's usual approach to cases involving FAA enforcement.
For LAPs, its appeal breaks down, however, because intracorporate
disputes often do not involve distinct economic interests in a real
sense.86 Rather, in the intracorporate context, these critical problems
should be acknowledged and addressed. Intracorporate disputes are a
feature of corporate governance. Their presence, or the threat of their
presence, should help to reduce agency costs and thus to increase firm
value.87 And firms that adopt LAPs as part of their governance have
flexibility in fashioning the procedures that will apply to the
intracorporate disputes. Given that, prospective LAP adopters should
proceed based on whether a particular LAP design will increase or
decrease firm value. Any IAP design thus must reckon with the
procedural and repeat-player problems, an undertaking that Part III
tackles.
86. That is, in shareholder derivative suits, the fiduciaries are usually
indemnified, leaving the firm to pay despite being the putative victim of the breach.
This is not always the case. For example, a former officer or director who sues for
fee advancement under an indemnification bylaw is suing for herself, not for any
corporate benefit. Similarly, shareholders exercising their appraisal remedies in the
context of an acquisition sue for themselves. And even derivative actions, although
the corporation is the real plaintiff in interest, can produce winners and losers among
old versus new shareholders depending on direct costs of the action and changes in
stock price resulting from them. Cf Marcel Kahan, Securities Laws and the Social
Costs of Inaccurate Stock Prices, 41 DUKE L.J. 977, 1006 (1992) ("When companies
raise capital at inaccurate prices, existing shareholders derive gains to the extent that
new investors overpay for their shares, and suffer losses to the extent that new
investors underpay."); cf infra note 93.
87. See infra notes 88-89 and accompanying text (discussing agency costs and
firm value).
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B. A Benefit-Cost Analysis of Intracorporate Arbitration
lAPs are a corporate-governance feature.88 The quality of
corporate governance-how well it mitigates agency costs89 versus
how much it itself costs-is one determinant of firm value.90 A value-
maximizing corporation would thus be expected to adopt only those
features that are expected to improve governance quality. Governance
features themselves may have associated costs on the front end, but
they should produce overall positive returns to firm value.91 To
illustrate, imagine a firm that spends two million dollars in legal fees
to defend against an intracorporate suit.92 These fees are part of
88. Corporate-governance features are mechanisms designed to mitigate the
agency problem. Some governance features, such as holding shareholder meetings
to elect directors or approve extraordinary transactions, are mandated by state
corporate law. But modem corporate law, at least applied to U.S. public companies,
commits most choices surrounding corporate governance to boards of directors. See
D. Gordon Smith, Matthew Wright & Marcus Kai Hintze, Private Ordering with
Shareholder Bylaws, 80 FORDHAM L. REv. 125, 128 (2011) ("[State corporation]
statutes, when combined with federal regulations of corporate governance, have
produced public corporations that are almost uniform in one important respect:
managers govern corporations, and shareholders participate only on the margins.");
Larry Fauver, Mingyi Hung, Xi Li & Alvaro G. Taboada, Board Reforms and Firm
Value: Worldwide Evidence, 125 J. FIN. ECON. 120, 146 (2017) ("We find that board
reforms increase firm value. Reforms involving board and audit committee
independence, but not reforms involving separation of chairman and CEO positions,
drive the valuation increases.").
89. The agency problem results from the separation of ownership and control
that typifies public corporations. This separation means management lacks complete
fidelity to the interests of shareholders. Agency costs in the corporate context are the
sum of shareholders' monitoring costs, management's bonding costs, and the degree
to which management falls short of maximizing shareholder interests. See Jensen &
Meckling, supra note 22, at 313. For example, a firm with high agency costs might
have entrenched or conflicted management who defalcate corporate resources or
shirk from improving business performance. High agency costs thus inversely
correlate with firm value.
90. See Ronald W. Masulis, Cong Wang & Fei Xie, Agency Problems at Dual-
Class Companies, 64 J. FIN. 1697, 1699-1700 (2009) ("[M]isusing corporate cash
reserves, demanding excessive remuneration, engaging in shareholder value-
destroying acquisitions, and making poor capital expenditure decisions are four
possible avenues for corporate insiders to secure private benefits at the expense of
outside shareholders.").
91. See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
92. See James R. Murray & Jared Zola, Uptick in Shareholder Derivative
Lawsuits Challenging Large M&A Deals Calls for Greater Attention to D&O
Insurance, BNA (May 2, 2014), https://www.bna.com/uptick-shareholder-
derivative-n17179890139 (explaining that investigation, special litigation
committee, and defense costs may reach "millions of dollars").
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shareholders' overall agency costs (because it is shareholder wealth
that is no longer available for distribution).93 Despite these fees, the
suit may well be worthwhile if it helps discipline management to make
decisions that deliver more than two million dollars in benefits to the
firm (i.e., decisions that would not have been made absent that
discipline). In other words, the utility or disutility of an LAP-whether
it is "worth it"-must be evaluated in terms of whether it improves or
reduces the quality of corporate governance.
94
This insight underlies why corporations do or do not adopt
lAPs, suggesting a model for the non-adoption/adoption decision that
assumes firms (1) are value-maximizing, (2) are constantly assessing
whether to adopt an LAP, and (3) will do so once adoption is expected
to improve governance quality and thus to increase firm value.
Overall, this assessment will follow a benefit-cost analysis: are the
aggregate benefits to be obtained from an LAP greater than the direct
and indirect costs of adoption?95 Given these assumptions, the
adoption assessment goes as follows:
Benefit-Cost Analysis Result
(Direct + Indirect) Benefits < (Direct + Indirect) Costs No LAP
(Direct + Indirect Benefits > (Direct + Indirect) Costs Adopt IAP
The benefits on the right of the inequality represent direct and
indirect savings a corporation might obtain from shifting
intracorporate disputes to arbitration, such as decreased legal fees or
nuisance settlements96 (direct savings flowing to the financial
93. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Reforming the Securities Class Action: An Essay
on Deterrence and Its Implementation, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1534, 1536 (2006)
("[B]ecause the costs of securities class action-both the settlement payments and
litigation expenses on both sides-fall largely on the defendant corporation, its
shareholders ultimately bear these costs indirectly and often inequitably.").
94. Michael Van Gorder, Comment, Boilermakers v. Chevron: Are Board
Adopted Arbitration Bylaws Valid Under the Delaware General Corporation Law?,
39 DEL. J. CORP. L. 443, 465 (2014) ("It is likely that some corporations will find
the cost savings, efficiency, and flexibility of arbitration to be a solution to intra-
corporate disputes while others will not.").
95. Changes to corporate governance are typically initiated by management
even if shareholder approval is ultimately sought or required. See Smith, Wright &
Hintze, supra note 88. Although LAPs may be adopted by either the board or
shareholders, this article makes the simplifying assumption that the decision whether
to adopt will be made solely by the board and that there is no bar to it doing so (i.e.,
shareholders will not withhold a necessary approval).
96. See Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880, 892 (2d Cir. 1982) (recognizing "attorney's
fees and other out-of-pocket expenses related to the litigation and time spent by
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statements) and decreased executive distraction or impediment to
strategic transactions (indirect savings on transaction costs).97 The
costs on the left represent direct and indirect costs an LAP may cause,
such as litigation over the adoption of an LAP itself (direct costs) and
discounts to stock prices (e.g., if shareholders believe an LAP will
increase agency costs and thus lower firm value) or reputational harm
with market actors that oppose IAPs (indirect costs).98
Alternatively, the inequality laid out in the chart above can be
thought of at a higher level: taking the benefits and costs of IAP
adoption together, ceteris paribus, does the firm have an expected net
increase to its firm value? If "yes," then the value-maximizing firm
will adopt the IAP because whatever costs shareholders will bear from
that decision they will more than recoup in benefits. This analysis is
driven by the insight that the procedures that apply to intracorporate
disputes are one determinant of overall agency costs and hence,
indirectly, firm value. Civil procedure is a value lever. Although firms
can deploy this lever to some extent by selecting between state fora,
in reality, procedure is substantially similar across the federal and state
systems.99 The degree of private-ordering flexibility inherent in an
corporate personnel preparing for and participating in the trial" and "indemnification
which is mandatory under corporate by-laws, private contract or [state] law" as
direct costs of derivative actions).
97. See id. (recognizing the "impact of distraction of key personnel by
continued litigation" and "potential lost profits" from bad trial publicity as indirect
costs of derivative actions).
98. See infra Part II.C. The leading proxy advisors, whose recommendations
many institutional investors rely on in casting their proxy ballots, oppose corporate-
governance features like IAPs. GLASS LEWIS, UNITED STATES GUIDELINES: AN
OVERVIEW OF THE GLASS LEWIS APPROACH TO PROXY ADvICE 17 (2019) (warning
that it may recommend that shareholders vote against the re-election of chairs or
members of governance-committees of companies that "require arbitration of
shareholder claims"); see also INST'L S'HOLDER SERVS., UNITED STATES PROXY
VOTING GUIDELINES: BENCHMARK POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 14 (2019)
(recommending that shareholders generally vote against or withhold votes from
directors when the board unilaterally amends the bylaws or charter "in a manner that
materially diminishes shareholders' rights"); see also Grundfest & Savelle, supra
note 70, at 356 ("[T]he true costs of adopting [forum-selection] provisions arise in
the context of the litigation that occurs over their validity and enforcement, and the
opposition likely to arise from shareholder advocacy groups.").
99. See Winship, supra note 34, at 532 ("The laboratory benefit is also a reason
to prefer tailored procedure to other forms of contract procedure that select a court.
Forum selection does not offer this opportunity for experimentation. Its main
function in the context of corporate litigation is to consolidate disputes in one
forum."). But see Koppel, supra note 24, at 1184-85 (examining the declining
influence of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure on the states' civil procedures).
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LAP, however, allows a firm greater leverage in increasing (or
decreasing) its value.
The following income statements and their simplifying
assumptions illustrate how an LAP, as a procedural lever, can affect
firm value. Scenario A is a control in which the firm does not have an
LAP, while scenarios B 1 through B3 are parallel scenarios in which
the firm has adopted differing lAPs.
(in monetary units) A B1 B2 B3
Net Revenue 500 500 500 500
(Net Expense)* (400) (400) (400) (426)
Intracorporate Dispute Expense
(Legal Fees) (5) (2) (2) (0)
(Settlements/Judgments) (20) (20) (10) (0)
Net Profit 75 78 88 74
Firm Value** 750 780 880 740
This amount excludes "Intracorporate Dispute Expense."
Assume (a) that the income statement is one-off and there is no
opening balance and (b) that the market strictly values the firm at
a 1 Ox multiple of its net profit.
In B 1, the IAP's streamlined procedures result in a 60%
decrease to legal-fee expense (e.g., fewer lawyers' billable hours),
with no impact on actual settlement/judgment expense (i.e., the
outcomes of intracorporate claims are the same as in A-they are
merely less expensive to reach). This reduction in legal-fee expense
results in a 4.00% increase in firm value as compared to A. If legal
fees are viewed as expost agency costs, in this case agency costs have
decreased, given no change in the merits outcomes of the firm's
intracorporate disputes or to its net revenue or expense.
In B2, legal-fee expense is reduced (compared to A) just as
with B1, but settlement/judgment expense is also cut in half. This
impact on settlement/judgment expense could stem, for example, from
arbitral procedures that make vindicating meritorious claims, or
obtaining settlements from unmeritorious claims, more difficult or
from ex ante disciplining of management o more closely align its
actions with shareholder interests rather than face streamlined
intracorporate claims (i.e., in which it has a greater chance of losing
than with a public judicial proceeding). In any case, the combined
reduction in legal-fee and settlement/judgment expense results in a
17.33% increase in firm value compared to A. These multiple possible
explanations for B2's reduced settlement/judgment expense
Fall 2018]
THE REVIEW OF LITIGATION
nevertheless all suggest that agency costs have been reduced. That
follows because net revenue and expense are the same as in A,
suggesting that the business has not suffered from the presence of an
LAP (e.g., management is not using the lAP to shirk or defalcate).
The final scenario demonstrates, however, that an LAP can
cause an increase in agency costs and a concomitant decrease in firm
value. In B3, the LAP has resulted in the elimination of expense related
to intracorporate disputes. This result might owe, for example, to
arbitral procedures that significantly reduce the ability of shareholders
to vindicate intracorporate claims and thus remove shareholder
litigation as a tool for disciplining management. The scenario also
shows that with management freed of this disciplining constraint, the
entire savings attributable to intracorporate-dispute expense has been
wiped out by an increase to net expense. That increase in net expense
might result, for example, from increases to executive and director
compensation or reduced focus on advancing the business. It might
even result from conflicted dealings with officers or directors (e.g., a
director leasing real estate to the firm at above-market rates). In any
case, the result is an overall increase in agency costs and a 1.33%
decrease in firm value compared to A.
This is all to say that LAPs are not the right governance feature
for all firms. Not all LAPs should be expected to increase firm value.
For the value-maximizing firm, an LAP may be counterproductive: its
benefits (say, faster resolution of intracorporate disputes) can be less
than its costs (say, opposition from shareholders, regulators, and the
like, reflected by lower share prices). Indeed, this point aligns with the
fact that LAPs are rare among public companies. 100 What causes this
rarity? The answer may partly owe to managers and their counsel
failing to consider LAPs' possibilities, or to the SEC's long-running
opposition to them.10' But, even absent those two constraints, the best
explanation is that firms will look to market practice, 102 and novelty
100. Cf Christos Ravanides, Arbitration Clauses in Public Company
Charters: An Expansion of the ADR Elysian Fields or a Descent into Hades?, 18
AM. REv. INT'L ARB. 371, 393 (2007) (identifying forty foreign-private issuers with
LAPs whose shares traded directly or indirectly on U.S. stock exchanges in 2007). In
comparison, only one domestic public company had an IAP that year, and it was
essentially a shell company. Id. at 394.
101. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
102. Compare Curtis J. Milhaupt, Property Rights in Firms, 84 VA. L. REV.
1145, 1194 (1998) ('The competitive efficiency concerns that drive the mechanisms
of convergence operate far more powerfully on firms than on political agents and
organizations. Thus, convergence will occur only where the political and social
structures that account for institutional inertia can be overcome."), with Lucian Arye
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and rarity thus sustain each other. In a world in which LAPs are not
common, a firm needs a compelling reason to become an early
adopter. The risk-adjusted cost of adopting an LAP absent
demonstrated, positive market practice may indeed be quite high. Will
we be sued over this, if so, will we win, what will shareholders think,
how will our reputation be affected are among the questions any
prospective early LAP adopter must ask itself. And only once the
waters are sufficiently proven by early adopters will other firms wade
in. 103
The proving in that case would be in showing that any costs of
LAPs are outweighed by their benefits. This result could prove true
because inputs to the benefit-cost analysis are not static (particularly
on the cost side). If early adopters are able to demonstrate that the risks
of an LAP are not as great as reckoned, this experience would mean
that for many firms LAPs would pass benefit-cost muster. 1
04
Circumstances do sometimes lead firms to adopt novel
corporate-governance features.1°5 Some firms and their counsel may
come to recognize that they face challenges that warrant the adoption
of LAPs-that the benefits in those discrete cases are significant
enough to outweigh the costs.'0 6 These firms will become early
Bebchuk & Mark J. Roe, A Theory of Path Dependence in Corporate Ownership
and Governance, 52 STAN. L. REv. 127 (1999) (arguing that corporate governance
is path dependent, not convergent, and offering explanations for this effect).
103. See Smith, Wright & Hintze, supra note 88, at 174 ("By facilitating
private ordering, we would expect each corporation to become a laboratory of
corporate governance, experimenting with different models of shareholder
participation and ultimately producing a diversity of governance forms and
practices.").
104. A positive experience like this is unlikely to be an accident, however. As
shown in this and Part III, maximizing the benefits to intracorporate arbitration and
minimizing its costs is a matter of institutional design. A value-increasing
intracorporate arbitral design will seek to enhance both the efficiency and fairness
of a corporation's governance. The benefits and costs discussed in this Part roughly
hew to the efficiency and fairness factors discussed in Part III.
105. Perhaps the most celebrated, studied, and (at the time) controversial
example of companies adopting a novel corporate-governance feature was the
shareholder rights plan, or poison pill. See Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, How
ILearned to Stop Worrying and Love the Pill: Adaptive Responses to Takeover Law,
69 U. CHi. L. REv. 871, 897-98 (2002) ("Shareholders... may have learned to love
the pill. According to this explanation, shareholder pressure to remove pills would
be isolated and concentrated in the relatively few companies that failed to adopt
effective adaptive devices."). See also, for an example of this early-adopter theory,
the discussion of Boilermakers in note 115 and its accompanying text.
106. This adoption decision assumes that there is not a less aggressive or
commonly used governance feature that would obtain the same benefit level at a
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adopters. As an example, imagine a mature company whose new
growth model relies heavily on speculative acquisitions, transactions
which risk being impeded by slow-moving derivative challenges. Or
consider a company that has eye-raising executive-compensation
practices, but that believes its plan properly aligns to its business
objectives. Or, as in the Carlyle example from the Introduction, think
of a private partnership that is going public and whose principals want
to maintain a governance structure they consider crucial to the
business.10 7 In these examples, whether shareholder claims opposing
these practices are meritorious or not,10 8 avoiding duplicative
litigation and resolving cases speedily may result in substantial
savings. Those savings are in the reduction in attorney's fees, yes. But
they are also in reducing opportunity costs, allowing management to
lower cost. For example, a corporation that merely seeks to avoid intracorporate
litigation in multiple fora could solve this problem by adopting a forum-selection
provision in favor of a preferred state's courts. Given the narrow goal, a forum-
selection provision should be chosen because it would not implicate the barriers
discussed in Parts II.B and II.C that IAPs face. In contrast, a firm that seeks to
address another problem, one resolvable by calibrating the civil procedure applicable
to its disputes, might find lAP adoption to be more appropriate.
107. Early IAP adoption may be seen in IPO companies, especially in
companies whose founders maintain a substantial amount of voting or executive
control. Investors may or may not discount stock prices in IPOs with aggressive or
unusual corporate-governance structures, but there are examples of newly public
firms adopting them. See, e.g., Snap, Inc., Amend. No. 3 to Registration Statement
on Form S-1 (Feb. 27, 2017) (public offering of non-voting shares only); Facebook,
Inc., Amend. No. 8 to Registration Statement on Form S-1 (May 16, 2012) (ten-to-
one voting ratio between insider and public shares). Of course, the Carlyle example
in the Introduction involved a private partnership transitioning to public status and
whose principals would maintain a leadership role in the business.
108. This article assumes that firms have a legitimate interest in avoiding
unmeritorious claims and in streamlining the resolution of the meritorious ones.
Sometimes officers and directors have acted ultra vires or have breached their
fiduciary duties. These are the cases that intracorporate litigation is made for.
Meanwhile, at least some intracorporate litigation is unmeritorious, if not outright
vexatious or frivolous. Which claims are which is debatable, and sussing out the
difference is beyond this project. Cf Elliot J. Weiss & John S. Beckerman, Let the
Money Do the Monitoring: How Institutional Investors Can Reduce Agency Costs
in Securities Class Actions, 104 YALE L.J. 2056, 85-56 (1995) (defining a "strike
suit" as when a "plaintiff's attorney initiates the action without reasonable grounds
to believe it has merit or, having initiated an action reasonably believing it was
meritorious, the attorney maintains the action after discovery makes clear the action
lacks merit" and concluding that such an action "has a negative net present value,
since the plaintiff has no prospect of prevailing on the merits and her attorney
inevitably will incur additional costs by continuing the litigation.").
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carry on business absent the distraction of pending litigation. 109 The
savings in these examples would come at a cost themselves. Firms that
face the types of challenges of these hypothetical early adopters might
already have a strained reputation with investors. Adopting an LAP to
mitigate these challenges might result in a net gain (i.e., the firm can
focus on its business, good for firm value), but it might concurrently
further harm the early adopter's reputation (i.e., decreasing investor
willingness to buy its shares, bad for firm value).
If early adopters successfully mitigate the costs-i.e., if they
demonstrate to the market that intracorporate arbitration at least
preserves the governance equilibrium between management and
shareholders or makes it more favorable to shareholders-these
experiences will catalyze increased adoption by reducing ex ante cost
perceptions among market participants and regulators. Conversely, if
these early adopters demonstrate that intracorporate arbitration tilts the
governance equilibrium nakedly toward management (and thus
increases agency costs), the perceived costs discussed earlier will be
realized and IAP adoption will be persistently rare. The following
chart illustrates this point:
109. See Coffee, supra note 93.
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Shareholders perceive increasingly common in
ability to bring market practice.
meritorious Adopters include those
intracorporate disputes without significant risk
C:5< CO and obtain relief is the
same or increased of facing costly
compared to prior to intracorporate disputes
IAP adoption. and those with strong
shareholder elations.
LAPs remain rare in
Shareholders perceive market practice.
ability to bring Adopters include those
meritorious with significant risk of
C > Co intracorporate disputes facing costly
and obtain relief is
decreased compared to intracorporate disputes
prior to lIP adoption. and those with weak
shareholder elations.
This comparison isolates just the costs of adopting an LAP,
which flow mainly from changes in shareholders' ability to use
intracorporate litigation as a vehicle for disciplining management. In
either of these cases, a corporation might decide to adopt an lAP
because the benefit-cost analysis justifies it, but the initial C < Co case
would be expected to predominate if LAPs are to become a common
market practice. In that case, shareholders see, ceteris paribus, the
agency costs they bear decreased or stay static. This result might mean,
for example, that streamlined arbitral procedures make it more
convenient for shareholders to pursue meritorious claims or that the
arbitrators chosen by the LAP's selection process have corporate-law
expertise superior to the judges of the firm's chartering jurisdiction. In
the second C > Co case, shareholders ee, ceterisparibus, agency costs
increase. This might owe, for example, to arbitral procedures that
reduce opportunities to obtain the discovery needed to prove a
meritorious claim.
Because adopting an IAP necessarily involves making choices
in what a given corporation's arbitral procedures will look like, the
costs of adoption are variable. If LAPs increase these costs over the
status quo-i.e., because they are untested and thus cause market or
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legal uncertainty-then they will be used only by firms that can obtain
oversized benefits that outweigh these costs. If IAPs come to be
associated with less uncertainty, however, the costs of adopting them
will be lower and thus they will be used by firms that stand to derive
more modest benefits from them. To illustrate this point, consider the
hypothetical costs and benefits for an early LAP adopter, E. If E adopts
an AP, it expects to bear a total cost of 20 value units, the sum of
discounts to its stock price (driven by market uncertainty regarding the
LAP itself) and legal expense from defending the validity of the
provision.11 However, E will accept the 20 units of cost in exchange
for 30 units of expected benefit (e.g., because it is a frequent target of
derivative claims), a net plus of 10 units. But if early adopters like E
demonstrate a model for how IAPs can reduce agency costs, then a
reduced level of market and legal uncertainty surrounding them will
lead to reduced costs for the typical fin's LAP and thus to a broader
universe of adopters. For example, if the hypothetical new cost
associated with LAP adoption is 5 value units, then it is worthwhile for
a later firm, L, to adopt one even if it expects benefits of only 8 value
units (e.g., it rarely faces derivative claims), a net plus of 3 units. In
other words, early adopters will require outsized benefits to offset the
outsized costs associated with adopting an AP. Lower the cost of IAP
adoption and the universe of firms that can obtain a net benefit from
them grows.
Thus, managing costs is the key to LAP adoption and, as Part
III shows, is the harder part of designing a model for how
intracorporate arbitration is to be done. With this general explanation
for a firm's non-adoption/adoption decision in place, the remainder of
this Part discusses several legal cost categories in deeper detail. This
discussion will apply to both the early-adopter and the later-adopter
firm, although early adopters will realize these costs more acutely.
These issues revolve around unsettled legal and policy questions that
can directly add to the costs of an early adopter (i.e., early adopters
must overcome legal and policy limits)."'
110. Of course, litigation is not a given. See Eric Talley, Public Ownership,
Firm Governance, and Litigation Risk, 76 U. CHI. L. REv. 335, 352-55 (2009)
(observing that governance features were not a statistically significant predictor of
shareholder litigation).
111. For comparison, forum-selection bylaws were formerly a novel corporate-
governance feature. Now, at least 746 public companies have adopted them. See
Romano & Sanga, supra note 70.
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C. Legal Barriers to Intracorporate Arbitration
Courts have not thoroughly tested or vindicated LAPs. 112 There
is no Supreme Court or leading state precedent, for example, adopting
the framework offered by Part I. Even if there were such a case, boards
must still only adopt LAPs that are consistent with their fiduciary
duties, meaning the risk of as-applied challenges to LAPs is persistent.
In light of this uncertainty, LAP adoptions, especially early ones, face
legal barriers, whether as facial or as-applied challenges from
shareholders or as opposition from state governments. 113
Early adopters in particular should prepare for facial and as-
applied challenges.1 14 Boilermakers exemplifies this risk.1 15 Prior to
the Delaware Chancery Court's decision in that case, a dozen public
companies that adopted forum-selection bylaws were sued by
shareholders on the ground that the bylaws violated the Delaware
General Corporation Law (DGCL). 116 Once faced with these suits, all
but two rescinded these provisions, though the court later held their
adoptions to be within the defendant boards' authority. 117 The two
holdout defendants, Chevron and Federal Express, despite their
success, nevertheless bore the expense of litigation, including between
them at least eight lawyers' hourly rates.118 And once an early
112. True, there is Commonwealth REIT. See supra note 16 and accompanying
text. But one trial-court decision regarding a specialized kind of public company (a
real-estate investment rust) hardly makes for new black-letter law.
113. The biggest barrier to lAPs has been, and to some extent still is, the SEC's
longstanding view-albeit it unaccompanied by rulemaking or explicit interpretive
guidance-that IAPs would violate the federal securities laws. See supra note 5 and
accompanying text. As the Introduction explains, that view's hold appears to be
slipping, meaning that the main legal and regulatory opposition to IAPs will shift to
the states. See supra notes 6-11 and accompanying text.
114. See Winship, supra note 34, at 536-37 ("Uncertainties about the validity
of litigation provisions and concern that shareholders will react negatively have been
barriers to adoption.... To a certain extent, uncertainty about the validity of
bylaws-the first barrier to adoption-may be temporary. Courts may issue binding
decisions in the future.").
115. Boilermakers Local 154 Ret. Fund v. Chevron Corp., 73 A.3d 934, 934
(Del. Ch. 2013).
116. Claudia H. Allen, Bylaws Mandating Arbitration of Stockholder
Disputes?, 39 DEL. J. CORP. L. 751, 759-60 (2015).
117. Id.
118. Boilermakers, 73 A.3d at 937 (listing eight attorneys of record between
Chevron and FedEx). Or rather, the Chevron and FedEx shareholders bore the cost
of the litigation because attorney and other fees-whether directly or through




adopter's IAP survives facial challenge, that is not the end to potential
challenges. Even corporate-governance features that courts have
facially vindicated, such as the shareholder-rights plan (or poison pill),
remain subject to as-applied challenges. 1
19
1. Facial and As-Applied Challenges
1 20
In adopting an LAP, directors must act consistently with the
corporation's best interests. Courts will review the propriety of
adoption under the business-judgment rule: judges will generally not
second guess directors' rational business decisions absent some breach
of fiduciary duty.121 This standard means that an LAP may be adopted
by a board if its members have a rational belief that the provision will
benefit the firm. 122 For example, directors may determine that an IAP
will limit frivolous intracorporate claims, or reduce legal fees or time-
to-resolution for meritorious ones. It also means that an LAP may not
be adopted by directors whose purpose is to breach their duty of
119. For example, in Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., the Delaware
Supreme Court upheld the use of poison pills as a permissible exercise of directorial
authority. 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985). But since Unocal, Delaware courts have heard
numerous as-applied challenges to directors' use of poison pills as defensive
corporate-governance features. See, e.g., Versata Enter., Inc. v. Selectica, Inc., 5
A.3d 586 (Del. 2010); Quickturn Design Sys., Inc. v. Shapiro, 721 A.2d 1281 (Del.
1998); In re Santa Fe Pac. Corp. S'holder Litig., 669 A.2d 59 (Del. 1995). See also
the discussion of the business-judgment rule infra note 121 and accompanying text.
120. IAPs will typically be adopted by boards as unilateral bylaws
amendments, and that is the scenario this article focuses on. But they may also be
adopted in charters (either initially or as amended and approved by shareholders) or
as shareholder-adopted bylaws. See supra note 34 and accompanying text. In cases
in which shareholders have blessed an LAP, there generally will be fewer fiduciary-
duty-related issues with adoption (although they could still arise, e.g., based on a
board's voting recommendation to shareholders). However, a board's decision
whether to enforce an IAP in a given case will always be subject to directors'
fiduciary duties. See Schnell, infra note 125.
121. See, e.g., Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805 (Del. 1984) ("It is a
presumption that in making a business decision the directors of a corporation acted
on an informed basis, in good faith and in the honest belief that the action taken was
in the best interests of the company."); see also CAL. CORP. CODE §309(a) ("A
director shall perform the duties of a director ... in good faith, in a manner such
director believes to be in the best interests of the corporation and its shareholders
and with such care, including reasonable inquiry, as an ordinarily prudent person in
a like position would use under similar circumstances."); Black v. Fox Hills North
Cmty. Ass'n, Inc., 599 A.2d 1228, 1231 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1992) ("The 'business
judgment' rule... precludes judicial review of a legitimate business decision of an
organization, absent fraud or bad faith.").
122. See supra note 52.
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loyalty, say, in order to insulate themselves from claims. Such a breach
might be evidenced by onerous arbitral procedures (for example, high
filing fees123 or significantly curtailed opportunities for discovery) or
by adopting an LAP that applies to pending litigation. In addition, a
board's decision to enforce an LAP-even if it was adopted or
approved by shareholders-is ubject to directors' fiduciary duties. 
124
That is, if it is in a corporation's best interests that an intracorporate
dispute proceed in a court rather than in arbitration, then a board must
not enforce an LAP 125 This decision too may end up in litigation.
126
Directors face legal risk in adopting any defensive governance
feature. In the case of intracorporate arbitration, the FAA's interaction
with state corporate law complicates and adds to this risk. LAPs are an
agreement to arbitrate. Given the FAA's robust national pro-
arbitration policy, lAPs generally should be expected to withstand
collateral attacks (i.e., challenges to the arbitration itself, not the
underlying intracorporate claim). The FAA does allow for non-
enforcement of arbitration agreements "upon such grounds as exist at
law or in equity for the revocation of any contract." 127 It also provides
for the vacation of arbitral awards "procured by corruption, fraud, or
undue means," for arbitrator corruption or partiality, and for
123. See American Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 570 U.S. at 236 (Scalia,
J.) (acknowledging that "filing and administrative fees attached to arbitration that
are so high as to make access to the forum impracticable" could satisfy the "effective
vindication" exception to arbitration-agreement enforceability); Green Tree Fin.
Corp. Ala. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 91-92 (2000) (suggesting that prohibitively
expensive filing fees could render an arbitration agreement unenforceable).
124. See Paramount Comm'ns, Inc. v. QVC Network, Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 48
(Del. 1994) ("[C]ontractual provisions ... may not validly define or limit the
directors' fiduciary duties under Delaware law or prevent... directors from carrying
out their fiduciary duties under Delaware law. To the extent that such provisions are
inconsistent with those duties, they are invalid and unenforceable.").
125. In its landmark decision in Schnell, the Delaware Supreme Court found a
board's amendment o a corporation's bylaws to advance the date of shareholder
elections to be a fiduciary breach because, despite its authority to amend the bylaws,
it did so for the purpose of thwarting a proxy challenge. Schnell v. Chris-Craft
Indus., Inc., 285 A.2d 437, 439 (Del. 1971).
126. Whether the arbitrability of a given claim depends on directors not
violating their fiduciary duties in enforcing arbitration-and whether this question
itself is determined by a court or an arbitrator-is an open question. See Howsam
v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S. 79, 84 (2002) ("[A] disagreement about
whether an arbitration clause in a concededly binding contract applies to a particular
type of controversy is for the court."); First Options of Chi., Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S.
938, 947 (1995) (whether a party consented to arbitration is subject to independent
judicial review).
127. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1947).
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arbitrators exceeding their authority or engaging in prejudicial
misconduct.128 These exceptions, however, address extreme cases.
Although the Supreme Court has acknowledged that arbitration
requires a level of due process, it is a rare case in which an arbitration
agreement is not enforced, or an arbitral award is not confirmed.
129
Instead, the Court's FAA decisions have steadily approved the
streamlining of civil-litigation procedures as an important part of the
FAA's national pro-arbitration policy.
130
LAPs are, however, a special case of arbitration agreement in
that they may be unilaterally imposed by actors (directors) who are
obliged to act in the best interests of other contractual parties
(corporations, or, indirectly, shareholders). This obligation extends
both to the creation of the arbitration agreement and to its
enforcement.1 3' The Supreme Court has accepted, albeit in the
consumer context, unilaterally imposed arbitration provisions as being
within the FAA's remit. In Concepcion, the Court enforced a class-
waiver arbitration provision that AT&T imposed as a unilateral
amendment, which was permitted in its initial adhesive contract with
its mobile-phone customers.132 That result exemplifies the Court's
history of upholding robust (even, arguably, aggressive) uses of
arbitration agreements, meaning it is primed to enforce lAPs.
Yet the potential for collateral attacks on LAP adoption and
enforcement still presents a legal barrier. The unilateral imposition of
an arbitration agreement worked in Concepcion, but there AT&T
owed no fiduciary duty to its customers, only those duties owed by
one arms' length contracting party to another.133 But in binding
shareholders present and future to bylaws amendments, directors must
look out for the corporation's best interests. This duty is a substantive
128. 9 U.S.C. § 10 (1947).
129. See generally Richard C. Reuben, Personal Autonomy and Vacatur After
Hall Street, 113 PENN. ST. L. REv. 1103 (2009) (explaining why attempts to vacate
an arbitral award rarely succeed).
130. See generally, e.g., DIRECTV, Inc. v. Imburgia, 136 S. Ct. 463 (2015);
Italian Colors, 570 U.S. at 228; CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwood, 565 U.S. 95
(2012).
131. See Hills Stores Co. v. Bozic, 769 A.2d 88, 107 (Del. 2000) (judicial
approval of"a board's decision to put defenses in place on a clear day does not mean
that the board will escape its burden to justify its use of those defenses in the heat of
battle....").
132. Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 336.
133. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 (1981) ("Every contract
imposes upon each party a duty of good faith and fair dealing in its performance and
its enforcement.").
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right held by a corporation under state law and is not waived by the
presence of an LAP (arbitration agreements are procedural and do not
affect substantive rights). 1
34
Owing to the rarity of LAPs, courts are not yet encountering
this intersection of corporate fiduciary duties with FAA enforcement.
But those cases will likely proceed in two steps: first, whether, under
state law, boards have acted ultra vires or in breach of their fiduciary
duties in adopting or enforcing an LAP, and second, whether (i)
adoptions are consistent with the FAA's Section 2 (agreement
formation) or (ii) agreement enforcement complies with the FAA's
Sections 4 (agreement enforcement) or 9 through 11 (award vacation).
Given the FAA's "liberal federal policy favoring arbitration,"'135 the
first step will generally dispose of the second because an improper
adoption means an arbitration agreement was not formed, while a
decision to enforce an LAP that is inconsistent with directorial duties
would also call into question whether the provision is binding in that
case. 136
Facial challenges may be a one-time governance cost (either
for each firm or for one landmark case that establishes the
permissibility of lAPs generally), but as with any defensive corporate-
governance feature, as-applied challenges will remain a risk for the
lifetime of an lAP. The cost of dealing with this collateral litigation
may be acceptable if an LAP sufficiently reduces overall agency costs.
Prospective adopters, however, must carefully weigh the potential
costs of collateral litigation in evaluating whether they expect an LAP
to reduce the firm's agency costs (and hence increase its value).
134. Concepcion and Italian Colors made this distinction by pointing out that
although plaintiffs were unable to access their ideal method-a class action-for
pressing their legal claims, they nevertheless had access to an arbitral forum to
vindicate those claims. See Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 333; Italian Colors, 570 U.S. at
228.
135. Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24
(1983).
136. Whether directors violate their fiduciary duties in a given case by
enforcing an IAP is a question of fact. See FDIC v. Jackson, 133 F.3d 694, 700 (9th
Cir. 1998). This could very well mean that an LAP adopter risks the muti-fora
litigation it IAP is aimed partly at avoiding. For example, if a shareholder files an
intracorporate dispute in state court, the company may, under the FAA, seek
enforcement of the IAP. This collateral litigation would require disposition before
the shareholder's intracorporate case could arbitrated. See Schnell, supra note 125.
Joseph Grundfest and Kristen Savalle have argued that although the choice of
Delaware as an exclusive forum will survive a collateral challenge, a "more nuanced
analysis" is appropriate for considering whether the selection of a foreign forum
violates the board's fiduciary duties. Grundfest & Savalle, supra note 70, at 403-04.
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Importantly, directors who adopt LAPs have considerable discretion in
designing what their intracorporate arbitration will look like. They will
greatly mitigate the risk of facing collateral litigation, or experiencing
losses if they do, by designing arbitral procedures that are
demonstrably in the corporate interest, that enhance governance
quality, and that are efficient and fair for intracorporate parties.'
137
2. State Public-Policy Opposition
Although Common Wealth REIT demonstrates at least one state
court recognizing the enforceability of LAPs under its corporate
laws,138 shareholder challenges may be catalyzed by state public-
policy opposition to intracorporate arbitration. The Supreme Court's
FAA jurisprudence frequently invokes that hostility to arbitration
motivated the statute's passing.1 39 Although state public-policy
opposition to arbitration agreements has manifested most commonly
with employment or consumer contracts, in some states LAPs will
likely also receive close scrutiny and public-policy opposition. The
stakes of many intracorporate disputes are high.140 This point is
especially true for states that actively compete in the national
marketplace for corporate chartering.141 These states, and others that
view lAPs as contrary to their public policy, may seek to prohibit,
137. At a minimum, for example, an lAP should accommodate the board's
fiduciary duties by including a "fiduciary out" provision. Granted, even without an
express "fiduciary out" provision, one may be implied. See Paramount, supra note
124. Adopters would also be better able to defend against as-applied challenges if
their IAPs are adopted on a "clear day" and not in contemplation of any specific
intracorporate dispute. Cf Hollinger Int'l v. Black, 844 A.2d 1022, 1080-81 (Del.
Ch. 2004) (holding invalid bylaws amendments that were "clearly adopted for an
inequitable purpose and have an inequitable effect").
138. Common Wealth REIT, No. 24-C13-001111, 2013 WL at 1915769.
139. Southland Corp., 465 U.S. at 16; see generally Aragaki, supra note 56
(explaining the Supreme Court's doctrinal test for determining when state law is
preempted by the FAA and, further, describing the Court's preemption framework
as a principle of antidiscrimination).
140. For example, Cornerstone Research examined public M&A deals
announced in 2010 and 2011 and found that deals valued over $100M drew 5.1
lawsuits on average. CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN
SHAREHOLDER LITIGATION INVOLVING MERGERS AND ACQuISITIONS, at 3 (2012),
http://www.cornerstone.com/files/upload/ShareholderMandALitigation.pdf.
Eleven deals drew fifteen or more lawsuits each, e.g., the Express Scripts acquisition
of Medco Health Solutions was valued at $29.37B and drew twenty two suits. Id.
141. See Roberta Romano, Law as a Product: Some Pieces of the
Incorporation Puzzle, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 225 (1985) for an explanation of the
competitive market for corporate chartering.
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restrict, or regulate IAPs. Those efforts would set the stage for the
further development, and likely extension, of FAA jurisprudence.
i. The Intersection of State Corporate
Law and the FAA
Delaware offers the leading example of state public-policy
opposition to LAPs. During its 2015 session, the Delaware General
Assembly added Section 115 to the DGCL, which permits the
adoption of forum-selection provisions by Delaware corporations.
142
The grant of this new power was in itself of no moment; it was already
recognized by Boilermakers.143 Rather, this amendment effected a
policy of allowing Delaware corporations to direct intracorporate
disputes to any forum they like, so long as that forum is a Delaware
court. Under Section 115, a shareholder of a Delaware corporation
may bring intracorporate litigation in Delaware courts
notwithstanding any other forum-selection provision, such as one
specifying arbitration or the courts of the state where the firm is
headquartered.44 Thus, the amendment constrains governance options
by purporting to expand them, while superseding precedent that
Delaware courts have no special claim to adjudicating the
intracorporate disputes of Delaware corporations.145 Delaware is not
142. 80 Del. Laws ch. 40, § 5 (2015) (adding DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 115)
The certificate of incorporation or the bylaws may require,
consistent with applicable jurisdictional requirements, that any or
all internal corporate claims shall be brought solely and
exclusively in any or all of the courts in this State, and no
provision of the certificate of incorporation or the bylaws may
prohibit bringing such claims in the courts of this State. 'Internal
corporate claims' means claims, including claims in the right of
the corporation, (i) that are based upon a violation of a duty by a
current or former director or officer or stockholder in such
capacity, or (ii) as to which this title confers jurisdiction upon the
Court of Chancery.
143. See Boilermakers, 73 A.3d at 934.
144. S.B. 75 syn., 148th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Del. 2015) ("Section 115
does not address the validity of a provision of the certificate of incorporation or
bylaws that selects a forum other than the Delaware courts as an additional forum in
which internal corporate claims may be brought, but it invalidates uch a provision
selecting the courts in a different State, or an arbitral forum, if it would preclude
litigating such claims in the Delaware courts.") (emphasis added).
145. See Baker, supra note 54.
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alone. Maryland has adopted a similar rule in its own corporate
statute. 
146
In one case, Bonanno v. VTB Holdings, Inc., the Delaware
Chancery Court has treated Section 115 as facially valid, albeit with
regard to a shareholder agreement that selected Texas as the exclusive
intracorporate forum. 147 As the Chancery Court noted in that case, the
Supreme Court's decision in M/S Bremen upheld the enforceability of
contractual forum-selection clauses subject to a "strong public policy"
exception, which Section 115 suffices to express. 148 However, no state
or federal court has tackled Section 115, or a provision like it, with
regard to intracorporate arbitration.
Section 115 exemplifies the potential for state public-policy
opposition against lAPs. 149 The interaction of state corporate law with
the FAA creates difficult second-order questions that this kind of
opposition could express.150 The FAA is a policy against anti-
arbitration discrimination, and the Supreme Court has been watchful
over state efforts to undermine this national policy through facially
neutral means. Rather than pursue explicit regulation of intracorporate
arbitration (as with the DCGL's Section 115), states might try to police
lAPs in subtler ways. For example, state law determines what
146. MD CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASSN'S § 2-113(b)(2)(ii) ("The charter or
bylaws of a corporation may not prohibit bringing an internal corporate claim in the
courts of this State or a federal court sitting in this State.").
147. Bonanno v. VTB Holdings, Inc., C.A. No. 10681-VCN, 2016 WL 614412
(Del. Ch. Feb. 8, 2016).
148. Id. at 14 (quoting M/S Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 15
(1972)) ("A contractual choice-of-forum clause should be held unenforceable if
enforcement would contravene a strong public policy of the forum in which suit is
brought, whether declared by statute or by judicial decision."); see also Southland
Corp., 465 U.S. at 10 ("In enacting § 2 of the [FAA], Congress declared a national
policy favoring arbitration and withdrew the power of the states to require a judicial
forum for the resolution of claims which the contracting parties agreed to resolve by
arbitration.").
149. Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 342 ("Other examples are easy to imagine. The
same argument might apply to a rule classifying as unconscionable arbitration
agreements that fail to abide by the Federal Rules of Evidence, or that disallow an
ultimate disposition by a jury (perhaps termed 'a panel of twelve lay arbitrators' to
help avoid preemption). Such examples are not fanciful, since the judicial hostility
towards arbitration that prompted the FAA had manifested itself in 'a great variety'
of 'devices and formula' declaring arbitration against public policy.") (quoting
Robert Lawrence Co. v. Devonshire Fabrics, Inc., 271 F.2d 402,406 (2d Cir. 1959)).
150. For example, the validity of a contract's arbitration provision is
determined by a court. Rent-A-Center v. Jackson, 561 U.S. 63, 70-71 (2010). If the
arbitration provision is facially valid, then the validity of the contract itself is
determined by the arbitrator. Id.
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directors' fiduciary duties are, and state courts (or legislatures) could
construe those duties in a way that impedes the adoption or
enforcement of an LAP. Or legislatures could amend their corporate
statutes to require shareholder approval of LAPs (but not other bylaws
provisions). Because the adherence of directors to their fiduciary
duties is fundamental both to board adoption and to the enforcement
of LAPs, these efforts would set a collision course with the FAA. 151
Courts and arbitrators faced with this intersection of state
corporate law and the FAA must confront it as a new frontier in FAA
jurisprudence.152 Actions seeking to enforce arbitration agreements
usually conclude in favor of arbitration. But an intracorporate-
arbitration/fiduciary-duty case would require a deeper, more searching
analysis than do typical FAA-enforcement actions.153 Fiduciary duty
binds directors' discretion for designing and enforcing arbitral
provisions, as compared to the discretion of parties to agree to
contractual terms when dealing at arm's length. As a concrete
example, a court or arbitrator may find that directors violate their
fiduciary duties by adopting or enforcing an LAP that outright prohibits
discovery. Prohibiting discovery, the reasoning would go, runs against
the corporate interest by making proving, and thus vindicating,
meritorious intracorporate claims difficult or infeasible. That decision
would be distinguishable from one holding a consumer arbitration
151. Cf Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 334 ("When state law prohibits outright the
arbitration of a particular type of claim, the FAA displaces the conflicting rule.").
152. Challenges to the validity of an arbitration provision itself are decided by
a court, whereas challenges to the validity of the entire contract are decided by an
arbitrator. Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 445-46 (2006)
("[A]n arbitration provision is severable from the remainder of the contract....
[U]nless the challenge is to the arbitration clause itself, the issue of the contract's
validity is considered by the arbitrator in the first instance.").
153. For example, in Italian Colors and Concepcion, the Supreme Court
identified informality and confidentiality as two of arbitration's most beneficial
features. Whatever benefits firms may obtain from intracorporate arbitration,
confidentiality and (to a degree) informality are likely not among them.
Intracorporate disputes deal with a large body of assets, whose residual beneficiaries
(shareholders) are widely dispersed and who have an attenuated link to their
managerial agents. Firms may be better off resolving intracorporate disputes with
less formality than that of traditional litigation, but these types of disputes require
more process than cellular-phone billing disputes. Cf Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 344-
45 (2011) ("It can be specified, for example, that proceedings be kept confidential
to protect trade secrets. And the informality of arbitral proceedings is itself desirable,
reducing the cost and increasing the speed of dispute resolution.") (citations
omitted). And, as a practical matter, their outcomes should not be kept confidential
from shareholders or the market.
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agreement unenforceable because its limitations on discovery hinder
a plaintiffs ability to make a case. In this light, arbitration in the
intracorporate context must focus on a firm's ability to maximize its
value through private ordering. This point implies that enforcing
directors' fiduciary duties would empower courts and arbitrators to
require greater arbitral due process than might be regarded as a
minimum in other FAA contexts. Policing how far this power extends
against the overall backdrop of the FAA's pro-arbitration policy,
though, will be a challenging undertaking. Firms that adopt LAPs must
factor this uncertainty into their LAP designs.
ii. Categories of State Public-Policy
Opposition
Delaware's Section 115 and public policies like it are unlikely
to survive challenge under the FAA. 154 It is instructive, though, to
consider the state-based anti-LAP policy categories discussed in the
next paragraphs. For example, although it is hard to be sure of the
Delaware legislature's motivations for adopting Section 115, it is
worth considering how the following categories might apply.1 55 These
categories are not only descriptive explanations for why states might
pursue public-policy opposition to LAPs, but they are also
justifications defendants might offer for why anti-IAP policy is not
preempted by the FAA.
State public-policy opposition to intracorporate arbitration,
whether judicial or legislative, will fall into one or more of three
categories: shareholder protection, law development, or franchise
defense. State public-policy opposition may take several forms,
154. See Christopher R. Drahozal, Federal Arbitration Act Preemption, 79
IND. L.J. 391, 408-09 (2004) (explaining why state laws that apply to arbitration and
some other types of contract clauses, but not all contract clauses, are preempted by
the FAA).
155. But see James D. Cox, Corporate Law and the Limits of Private Ordering,
93 WASH U. L. REv. 257, 257 (2015) (suggesting that Section 115 was at least partly
motivated by "pacifying" the Delaware bar that it would not lose "lucrative
shareholder suits ... because of the chilling effect of a loser pay rule for shareholder
suits."). The Corporate Council, a body within the Delaware State Bar Association,
acknowledged the potential that in advocating for Section 115, it would be criticized
for the legislation's appearance of protectionism. It rejected this criticism as failing
to "address the substance or merits of the issues." Corporate Council, Delaware State
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including judicial applications of corporate law to prohibit or burden
the use of LAPs or legislation allowing shareholders to bring
intracorporate litigation in state court notwithstanding the presence of
a mandatory lAP. 156 Opposition might even be as modest as statutes
requiring shareholder approval of lAPs, or statutes that expressly
authorize IAPs subject to procedural conditions that go beyond the
minimal due process required by the FAA. The breadth of the Supreme
Court's construction of the FAA means that state attempts to bar or
burden lAPs are vulnerable to challenge. However, as Part II.B
describes, policy opposition is a barrier to lAP adoption because it
imposes on adopting corporations the uncertainty and cost of
vindicating their lAPs.
Shareholder protection. The first category, shareholder
protection, deals with opposition to arbitration out of a belief that it
allows for insufficient vindication of substantive state rights, or even
serves to make substantive state rights effectively unenforceable.157
This belief is motivated by the criticism of arbitration that it, compared
to a judicial forum, creates procedural hurdles for claimants and
privileges drafting parties (usually employers or consumer companies,
but in this case, management). In this view, state opposition seeks to
ensure that plaintiffs-typically, shareholders-have access to state-
run judicial process, which it reckons to be fairer and more equitable
than arbitration. Shareholder protection may also take the form of a
state asserting its interest in protecting the shareholders of firms
formed under its laws, which it may have a particular strategy for
effecting. 1
58
As Part I.B discusses, the Supreme Court in Concepcion and
Italian Colors has rejected this view: it is no reason to discriminate
against an arbitration provision that a judicial forum may closer
156. See notes 144, 148, and accompanying text.
157. For example, Concepcion held California's Discover Bank rule-which
prohibited barring class-action waivers in adhesive arbitration agreements involving
small amounts of damages, unequal bargaining power, and the use of class-action
waivers to insulate the drafter from claims-to be preempted by the FAA. See 563
U.S. at 352, abrogating Discover Bank v. Sup. Ct., 113 P.3d 1100 (Cal. 2005).
158. See Helen Hershkoff & Marcel Kahan, Forum-Selection Provisions in
Corporate "Contracts " at 6 (NYU L. & Econ. Res. Paper Series No. 17-28) (2017)
("Arguably, [forum-selection terms'] emergence in corporate practice is part of a
strategy to curb abuses in representative litigation, with the Delaware judiciary as
chief designer of that strategy. Centralizing intra-corporate disputes involving
Delaware corporations-as is achieved through corporate forum-terms-may be




approach a state's ideal of what civil due process should look like
(provided the arbitration satisfies the FAA's minimum due-process
requirements).159 But, as Part I.B further discusses, this decisional law
would extend to state opposition to intracorporate arbitration as
well.160 As Part III explains, however, robust due process for all parties
to intracorporate arbitration is an imperative of intracorporate arbitral
design, even if it is not a justification for states to discriminate against
LAPs.
Law development. The second category, law development,
opposes arbitration out of concern that it "ousts"' 161 the jurisdiction of
state courts and thus threatens to impoverish the development of state
corporate law. This effect follows from state courts hearing fewer
cases and thus having fewer opportunities to expand, explain, or
modify corporate law. 162 This and the prior category seem most likely
to be offered by states or litigants in justifying policies that
discriminate against IAPs. However, as with the shareholder-
protection concerns discussed above, a policy opposing intracorporate
arbitration on law-development grounds would likely not withstand
challenge under the FAA. It is, after all, a criticism that can be leveled
against a fair portion of the arbitrations that already occur, particularly
those that raise novel legal or factual issues.163 Nevertheless, just as
159. Under the FAA, arbitral awards may be vacated on limited grounds. See
supra note 128 and accompanying text. More, the Supreme Court has remained open
to an "effective vindication" exception to arbitration-agreement enforcement, a
functional due-process requirement for the arbitration context. See supra note 123
and accompanying text.
160. Note, however, that the criticism implicit in this first category touches this
article's main project-what intracorporate arbitration should look like.
161. See M!S Bremen, 407 U.S. at 12 ("The argument that [forum-selection]
clauses are improper because they tend to 'oust' a court ofjurisdiction is hardly more
than a vestigial legal fiction. It appears to rest at a core on historical judicial
resistance to any attempt to reduce the power and business of a particular court
.... "); see also Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of Am., Inc., 350 U.S. 198, 210-11
(1956) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (referring to the "traditional judicial hostility
against ousting courts... of their jurisdiction.").
162. See Michael A. Scodro, Note, Arbitrating Novel Legal Questions: A
Recommendation for Reform, 105 YALE L.J. 1927, 1949 (1996) ("Another difficulty
with resolving novel legal questions in private arbitration is the fact that this very
process deprives the courts of the opportunity to resolve unsettled issues of statutory
interpretation.").
163. See Rex R. Perschbacher & Debra Lyn Bassett, The End of Law, 84 B.U.
L. REv. 1, 30 (2004) ("[A]rbitration resolves disputes without contributing to the
body of law and without providing information to the public. The increase in
arbitration clauses and arbitration proceedings means that more and more potential
law is being lost.").
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with the shareholder-protection criticism above, this second category
hits a legitimate policy concern. The opportunities state courts have to
interpret their corporate laws is a function of the volume and types of
cases they get. The resulting decisions are a public good for all firms
chartered in that state: more decisional law brings greater certainty to
the law as it applies to a given firm's own governance. If cases
(particularly the novel ones) are diverted to arbitration, there is a real
risk of impoverishing the development of states' corporate laws.164
That would be a particular blow to the public interest because a case's
precedential value flows downstream from its litigants' interests in
resolving their dispute. 
165
Arbitrators hearing intracorporate cases also benefit when they
have clear, controlling precedent to guide their analyses. Thus,
diminished corporate dockets would threaten to increase legal
uncertainty for all firms regardless which fora hear their intracorporate
disputes. For IAP adopters, this is a risk they too have an interest in
mitigating because, like any other firm, they benefit from certainty
regarding their governance. In keeping with that interest, Part III offers
institutional design principles to avoid impoverishing law and even,
possibly, to enrich it.
Franchise defense. The third category, franchise protection,
like "law development," opposes arbitration in order to avoid judicial
"ouster," but is motivated by a policy of defending a state judiciary's
competitive advantage, say, for its adjudicative expertise.166 There
164. See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 31 (1991)
(petitioner contending because "arbitrators often will not issue written opinions" and
due to the "inability to obtain effective appellate review," that there will be a "stifling
of the development of the law."). Judge Harry Edwards, in urging broader judicial
review of arbitral awards, warned of "public law issues [being] resolved by
nongovernmental bodies." Harry T. Edwards, Alternative Dispute Resolution:
Panacea or Anathema?, 99 HARV. L. REv. 668, 672 n.13 (1986).
165. See Edward Brunet, Questioning the Quality of Alternate Dispute
Resolution, 62 TUL. L. REV. 1, 19-20 (1987) ("Society gains more from litigation
than would be produced if litigation were left to the private market."); Geoffrey C.
Hazard, Jr. & Paul D. Scott, The Public Nature of Private Adjudication, 6 YALE L.
& POL'Y REv. 42, 59 (1988) ("Ordering by public justice produces decisions resting
on considerations that transcend the immediate dispute and the immediate parties
[whereas] [o]rdering by private disposition can involve a normative frame of
reference that includes only the immediate parties.").
166. Professor Lynn LoPucki described forum-selection bylaws as starting a
vicious cycle for Delaware's chartering business: the clauses prompt management
strategically to take cases out of Delaware courts, thus influencing Delaware courts
to become more favorable to management (to protect their franchise) and thereby
damaging Delaware charters' legitimacy in the market. Professor LoPucki views
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may be different motivations for franchise defense, but foremost
would be a state securing its corporate chartering revenue in the
national market for corporate law.167 This final category, whether it is
intended to favor the state's interest or the interest of some of its
citizens, is protectionist. Franchise protection against LAPs would
clash with the FAA and the Constitution's Dormant Commerce and
Full Faith and Credit Clauses, leaving it vulnerable to legal
challenge.168 The vulnerability of such a policy would, of course, be
greater if it was motivated by private interests (e.g., to preserve
attorneys' business) versus purely state interest (e.g., to maintain state
chartering revenue).
169
LAPs as a potential "coup de grace" for Delaware, because without cases, it would
lose its judiciary-based competitive advantage over other states' chartering
franchises. Lynn M. LoPucki, Delaware's Fall: The Arbitration Bylaws Scenario,
in CAN DELAWARE BE DETHRONED?: EVALUATING DELAWARE's DOMINANCE OF
CORPORATE LAW 35 (Stephen Bainbridge et al. eds., 2018).
167. Faith Stevelman, Regulatory Competition, Choice of Forum, and
Delaware's Stake in Corporate Law, 34 DEL. J. CORP. L. 57, 64 (2009) (recognizing
the risk of pro-management "partisanship in Delaware's own adjudication"
stemming from its "financial and prestige-based stakes in promoting its successful
chartering business").
168. See Tenn. Coal, Iron, & R.R. Co. v. George, 233 U.S. 354-60 (1914) ("[A]
state cannot create a transitory cause of action and at the same time destroy the right
to sue on that transitory cause of action in any court having jurisdiction. That
jurisdiction is to be determined by the law of the court's creation and cannot be
defeated by the extraterritorial operation of a statute of another state, even though it
created the right of action."). Some courts, however, have erroneously dismissed
causes of actions because they have interpreted a state's law as assigning exclusive
jurisdiction to its courts, rather than allocating subj ect-matter jurisdiction within its
own judiciary. For example, in Reserve Solutions Inc. v. Vernaglia, a books-and-
record claim against a Delaware corporation was dismissed on the basis of the
DGCL vesting "exclusive" jurisdiction over such claims in Delaware's Chancery
Court. 438 F. Supp. 2d 280, 286 (S.D.N.Y. 2006). But see IMO Daniel Kloiber
Dynasty Trust, supra note 47 (observing that Delaware state statutes that assign
exclusive jurisdiction to a particular Delaware court are merely allocating
jurisdiction among the Delaware courts-not making a claim that no court outside
of Delaware can exercise jurisdiction ).
169. See United Haulers Ass'n, Inc. v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Wast Mgmt.
Auth., 550 U.S. 330 (2007) (recognizing that states may discriminate against out-of-
state economic actors in favor of their economic interests (but not those of private
in-state actors), an exception to the rule that under the Dormant Commerce Clause
such out-of-state discrimination receives strict-scrutiny review). Professor Jill Fisch
has argued that although self-interested Delaware attorneys played a part in Section
115's passage, the legislation promoted public interests, particularly around revenue,
and so it should not be viewed as protecting the business interests of the Delaware
bar. Jill E. Fisch, The New Governance and the Challenge of Litigation Bylaws, 81
BROOK. L. REv. 1637, 1673-74 (2016).
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III. FAIRNESS, EFFICIENCY, AND Two MODELS OF
INTRACORPORATE ARBITRATION
Whether IAPs are accepted by the market depends whether the
market expects them to have a positive or a negative effect on firm
value. This Part argues that intracorporate arbitration can increase firm
value, and that it is most likely to do so if it is conducted through a
well-designed institution, rather than through an ad hoc, non-
institutional approach.
A. Efficiency and Fairness in Intracorporate Arbitration
Intracorporate arbitration could decrease agency costs by
reducing the expense to the firm of being sued by shareholders (or
directors or officers)-that is, efficiency-while preserving or even
enhancing litigants' ability to vindicate meritorious claims-that is,
fairness. 170 These two terms map more or less onto the benefit and cost
sides of the inequality laid out in Part II.B. This Part argues that these
two factors can (and should) increase in tandem, despite the intuition
that enhancing one (usually, efficiency) will degrade the other
(usually, fairness). 
171
"Efficiency" is the degree to which corporate resources are not
spent on intracorporate disputes, whether that expense comes from,
e.g., legal fees, settlements, or managerial distraction. 172 A completely
efficient procedure resolves intracorporate claims instantly (whether
they succeed on the merits or not) so that no corporate resources are
spent getting to the resolution.
Improvements to efficiency result in direct and indirect
savings. They are achieved, for example, by limiting costs related to
duplicative or unmeritorious litigation, and also in reducing costs
associated with resolving meritorious claims. Duplicative claims are
avoided via LAPs the same as with any other forum-selection
provision, by avoiding litigating over the same issues in multiple fora.
For example, shareholder suits are often criticized as being driven by
plaintiffs' attorneys seeking rent, who initiate nuisance cases that
170. See Koppel, supra note 24.
171. These two defined terms offer a useful way for thinking about monitoring
and agency costs generally, but the use of them here is limited to intracorporate
disputes. See Koppel, supra note 24, who uses these terms in much that same way
as this article.




result in attorney fees but little, if any, benefit to the corporation or its
shareholders.173 Accepting that view, for argument's sake, these
attorneys will have reduced incentive to pursue nuisance claims
because a single forum (potentially one with a reluctant take on
settlements that result mainly in attorney fees, or with heightened
pleading standards) or streamlined process presents less opportunity
to collect rent.
And "fairness" is the degree to which meritorious
intracorporate claims are vindicated and unmeritorious claims are
defeated, no matter the corporate or litigant resources or time, needed
to reach the outcome. At its core, fairness is the ability of shareholders
to vindicate meritorious intracorporate claims. Shareholders
sufficiently empowered to pursue such claims are able to exert ex ante
discipline on management. Well-disciplined management is motivated
to pursue corporate interests over its own, partly out of a desire to
avoid litigation, especially litigation it is likely to lose (i.e.,
meritorious claims).174 Fairness comprises both the ability of
173. See Charles R. Korsmo & Minor Myers, The Structure of Stockholder
Litigation: When Do the Merits Matter?, 75 OHIO ST. L.J. 829, 839 (2014) ("[A]
danger always exists that legal claims may be brought not in the realistic expectation
of a judgment on the merits but rather to capitalize on the nuisance value of the
claim."); Elliot J. Weiss & Lawrence J. White, File Early, then Free Ride: How
Delaware Law (Mis)shapes Shareholder Class Action, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1797, 1855
(2004) (suggesting that rather than plaintiffs' attorneys being motivated to advocate
for shareholders, it is "more likely" that they "are motivated primarily by self-
interest and that their litigation efforts ... produce little in the way of meaningful
benefits for the shareholders .... "); Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Suing Solely to Extract
a Settlement Offer, 17 J. LEGAL STUD. 437, 440 (1988) (describing a plaintiff's
ability to impose litigation costs on defendants as a lever to extract settlements for
uncertain claims).
174. Granted, that are doubts regarding the importance and efficacy, as a matter
of governance, of this monitoring tool because directors and officers of public
companies are typically exculpated for breaches of their duty of care and enjoy
indemnification coverage paid for by the corporation, i.e., ultimately, the
shareholders. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Unocal at 20: Director Primacy in
Corporate Takeovers, 31 DEL. J. CORP. L. 769, 785 (2006) ("Corporate directors
operate within a pervasive web of accountability mechanisms that substitute for
monitoring by residual claimants."). That is not to say derivative actions don't carry
personal consequences. After all, defendants face reputational risk and
inconvenience when they are sued for breaching their fiduciary duties, even if they
don't themselves foot the bill. See Bernard Black, Brian Cheffins & Michael
Klausner, Outside Director Liability, 58 STAN. L. REv. 1055, 1140 (2006) ("The
limited deterrence provided by out-of-pocket liability is supplemented by market
incentives, reputation, and other soft incentives, including the substantial nuisance
of being sued.").
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shareholders and other stakeholders to access an equitable
adjudicative forum (for example, with unbiased adjudicators and
adequate procedural rights) and also to do so at a reasonable cost (for
example, with the ability to pool resources in a class or to obtain
reimbursement from the corporation). Fairness to shareholders also
means that unmeritorious claims are not vindicated because they, by
definition, serve no monitoring or disciplinary purpose and instead
waste corporate assets and thwart corporate opportunities, including
through the legal expenses they cause and their ability to distract
management and delay business initiatives.
There is a consistent tension between the efficiency and
fairness factors. Assuming that the burdens of production and
persuasion rest on the party bringing an intracorporate claim, a highly
efficient process-perhaps one with no discovery or testimony and.
short, summary hearings-would efficiently dispatch unmeritorious
claims. By definition, unmeritorious claims are incapable of having
their burdens of proof carried, and thus it redounds to shareholders'
benefit if they are efficiently defeated before they can waste corporate
assets. But just as efficiency would prevent false positives, it would
also cause false negatives. Meritorious claimants must also carry their
burden, and a highly efficient process would prevent proving many-
or, perhaps, most-of them. Shareholders are harmed when
meritorious claims-and the disciplining and monitoring roles they
serve-go unvindicated. But, despite this tension between efficiency
and fairness, optimizing for both factors is an important goal of
intracorporate-dispute procedure, just as it is for any civil
procedure.175 These factors hold particular salience for intracorporate
disputes because resolving them, for the most part, is not doing the
work of balancing equities between two economically distinct
litigants. Apart from unreimbursed plaintiff costs, the corporation
generally bears the entire cost of intracorporate litigation, whether
directly or through higher premiums paid for directors-and-officers
175. Professor Jessica Erickson describes civil procedure as a process for
sorting meritorious from unmeritorious claims. Heightened Procedure, 102 IoWA L.
REV. 61 (2016). She criticizes "transsubstantive" civil procedure-procedure that
applies to all cases-as being suboptimal. This suboptimality results from different
substantive areas of the law being associated with different causes of unmeritorious
claims. Id. at 62-63. Instead of being transsubstantive, she argues that procedure
should be calibrated to detect a lack of merit as it typically manifests in different
substantive areas of law. In doing so, she points out that legislatures have already
followed this approach in some areas, including medical malpractice and securities
fraud. Id. at 109, 113.
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insurance.'76 When shareholders sue, they tax themselves. And so the
procedures applied to intracorporate disputes help determine how
much of a firm's resources go to managing its agency costs (and those
expenses themselves roll into its overall agency costs).
In light of this tension, one key appeal of IAPs is the
opportunity to resolve intracorporate disputes under procedural rules
that are both more efficient and fairer than those offered by judicial
fora, or that at least do a betterjob of optimizing between the two. This
opportunity is realized by calibrating rules to the unique needs and
context of intracorporate disputes, rather than to civil litigation
generally.177 The rules might, for example, set default document and
deposition discovery schedules that are tailored to certain types of
intracorporate disputes (the point being to get claimants the discovery
that they need to prove claims without wasting time and resources on
discovery disputes or motion practice). This opportunity can also be
achieved by quasi-procedural rules, such as by being flexible in where
arbitrations physically occur and by eliminating the participation of
local counsel when lead attorneys do not practice in the forum state. 
178
The point is that the tension between efficiency and fairness is natural
and constant, but an improvement to one need not necessarily cause a
decline in the other.
Assuming the substantive corporate law applied to a dispute is
fixed regardless the forum, and assuming that adjudicators always
reach the correct legal and factual conclusions under given procedural
constraints,179 then procedure is the determinant of the agency costs
176. See Leslie N. Silverman, Stockholder Adoption of Mandatory Individual
Arbitration for Stockholder Disputes, 36 HARV. J.L. & PUB POL'Y 1187, 1194 (2013)
("Class actions generally result in institutional stockholders effectively suing
themselves, paying high defense costs and giving plaintiffs' attorneys a large
percentage of the settlement amount.").
177. See supra notes 99 and 175.
178. For example, proceedings might be in city convenient to the parties or
their law firms. This flexibility would allow parties to avoid the expense of hiring
local counsel in the dispute venue, or traveling for hearings or trials.
179. This simplifying assumption means that adjudicators will correctly
understand and apply substantive law to the facts, but it also means that procedure
necessarily shapes the factual record and thus can influence the application of the
law to the facts. But cf Bernard S. Black, Is Corporate Law Trivial?: A Political
and Economic Analysis, 84 Nw. U.L. REv. 542, 589 (1990) ("Because of Delaware's
small size and its many corporate charters, Delaware judges see a high proportion of
corporate cases, and develop corporate expertise".). But see David Horton, Clause
Construction: A Glimpse into judicial and Arbitral Decision-Making, 68 DUKE L.J.
1322, 1358-68 (2019) (finding that arbitrators are statistically more likely than
federal courts to construct arbitration clauses as allowing class actions).
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attributable to the claim. Procedure's role as a value lever means that
a procedure that vindicates meritorious claims and defeats
unmeritorious claims with perfect efficiency will increase firm value,
whereas one that takes an indefinite amount of time and that vindicates
unmeritorious claims and defeats meritorious ones will decrease
value. Beyond those two outer limits of the efficiency/faimess
function, the equilibrium between the two will determine whether their
combined effect on firm value is positive or negative. This article's
project is to show that firms can affect that equilibrium. The next two
Sections describe two models for doing so-non-institutional
arbitration and institutional arbitration-and explain that the latter is
most likely to be associated with improvements to efficiency and
fairness, and thus to increases in firm value.
B. The Non-Institutional Model
The first model is the non-institutional model, a default in
which firms replace the exogenous institutional authority of courts
with internally developed arbitral procedures and practices. Firms
following this approach draft bespoke LAPs that specify procedures
for filing a complaint, selecting the panel, and conducting the
arbitration. Under this model, arbitrators typically will be drawn as
individuals, rather than as members employed by any particular
institution. And, although an LAP might adopt or modify an external
set of arbitral rules to govern its intracorporate arbitrations (such as
those of the American Arbitration Association), the external author of
those rules (even if it is an institution) has no direct role in enforcing
them. 180 The problem with this ad hoc approach is that it may result in
a reduction to firm value due to the procedural and repeat-player
problems laid out in Part II.A. These results might flow in some cases
from management's designing the IAP to support its entrenchment or
defalcation. More alarmingly, these problems could also arise
innocently from management that simply wants to reduce the cost of
intracorporate litigation, but that adopts procedures that make it harder
to vindicate meritorious claims. 1
81
180. For example, the IAP proposed by Carlyle specified that the Rules of
Arbitration of the International Chamber of Commerce would apply to the extent
they were consistent with the LAP itself. Carlyle Registration Statement, supra note
1, at A-59.
181. For example, a special litigation committee might propose a well-
regarded practitioner to serve as arbitrator, ignoring the risk that on a daily basis she
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That is not to say that a non-institutional lAP could not
increase firm value and thus earn market confidence as an appropriate
corporate-governance feature. Thoughtful counsel might well design
intracorporate arbitral procedures that balance the efficiency and
fairness factors this Part discusses. Early lAPs using this approach
would then become public precedents, giving firms models and
empirical observations from which to develop efficient and fair lAPs
for subsequent adopters. This world is possible. But this approach is a
gamble for firms and the market to take. The flexibility of corporate
governance means that firms have many options for value-maximizing
private ordering. This flexibility does not mean, however, that
management, left to devise and control a key constraint-that is, being
sued--on its own acts and omissions will choose efficient and fair
arbitral procedures and practices or stick to them if they end up
frustrating its own interests. In other words, management has an
incentive to choose arbitral procedures that benefit management. And
even if it does not choose such procedures in the first place, if
claimants are successful under them, management has an incentive to
change the procedures to become more defensive. Thus, the
endogeneity that inheres in this model could lead to higher agency
costs in the form of reduced ex ante managerial discipline and
diminished opportunities for ex post enforcement. 1
82
If anything, the repeat-player problem discussed in Part II.A
appears persistently, and ominously, in the non-institutional model.
After all, management is likely to have an outsized influence on the
selection of arbitrators under this model. It is easy to imagine that
arbitrators (whether retired judges, practicing attorneys, legal
academics, or others) seen as more favorable to management are more
likely to be picked. Instead, shareholders will have a better guarantee
that intracorporate claims are heard efficiently and fairly if LAPs
require exogenous enforcers, a role traditionally played by courts.
Whatever benefits firms could achieve from lAPs, dispatching with
adjudicative exogeneity is unlikely to lead to them.
The non-institutional model is one in which IAPs, at least
compared to judicial fora, are apt to privilege management in
intracorporate disputes over meritorious shareholder claims. This
works on behalf of the management of her existing clients and is likely to see issues
through their eyes.
182. See Lipton, supra note 44, at 628 n.261 ("Even forum selection bylaws
are not comparable [to lAPs] because it is the unique ability of parties to the action,
such as directors, to manipulate arbitral procedures that gives rise to the suspicion
of self-interest; public courts are not susceptible to the same manipulation.").
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model may be designed intentionally by management to reach this
result, thereby insulating it from intracorporate challenge. In such
cases, the gains from efficiency achieved by intracorporate arbitration
may well be offset by the costs to fairness, leading either to
management's lack of focus on value-maximization or its engaging in
conflicted behavior. At the same time, aspects of this model might be
adopted by well-meaning boards that are motivated simply to direct
their intracorporate disputes into a forum that avoids duplicative or
unmeritorious litigation and that speeds up the resolution of these
disputes. But the adoption of this model by well-meaning firms may
nevertheless result in costs that exceed benefits. This is because the
model's features may diminish management discipline, which in turn
may lead to reduced firm value (even if that is not the motivation for
adopting an IAP). These risks counsel that a firm's management,
shareholders, and advisers should carefully consider the dynamic
implications for the firm's value before adopting an LAP employing
this non-institutional model. But the risks also raise a question: is there
a better way?
C. The Institutional Model
The non-institutional model is characterized by endogenous
arbitral procedures and practices that are unconstrained by an
adjudicative institution. Under the institutional model, however, a firm
makes a credible commitment to a credible institution. That is to say,
an adopting firm must satisfy the market that its intracorporate
disputes will be heard by an arbitral institution that (i) efficiently and
fairly enforces state corporate laws and the firm's charter and bylaws
and (ii) is exogenous to and independent of the firm's management.
An "arbitral institution" may take on many potential organizational
forms, such as not-for-profit associations set up by public companies
or the securities industry, judicial bodies within national stock
exchanges, for-profit service providers, or something else altogether.
At minimum, an "arbitral institution" is an institution with permanent
and expert personnel and established rules and procedures that effect
a privately ordered adjudicative system designed for resolving
intracorporate disputes.
This model recommends a relatively formal approach to
dispute resolution that goes beyond what would be expected in the
non-institutional model or that would be seen in most commercial or
consumer arbitrations. This is not a rejection of the benefits of the
informality of arbitration but, rather, an embrace of arbitration's
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private-ordering flexibility to adapt to the context of the dispute.
Adjudications by an arbitral institution may be more formal than those
whose "essential virtue [is] resolving disputes straightaway."'1 83 But
these adjudications will at the same time be more flexible and informal
than traditional litigation. The procedural formalities this model
maintains-such as the issuance of written opinions and the
availability of appeals-accommodate that a single intracorporate
dispute implicates the interests of many shareholders and, in some
instances, enormous amounts of shareholder wealth.184 This context
justifies borrowing features of traditional litigation. Doing so means
that there will not only be better adjudicative results in the
intracorporate context, but also increased market acceptance of the
arbitral forum itself.
Part II.C describes the institutional model and the credible
arbitral institution in terms of design principles. These design
principles are meant to resolve, or at least to mitigate, arbitration's
potential deficiencies, including concerns about procedural adequacy,
the repeat-player problem, and the stifling of law development. The
model's design principles comprise three broad commitments: a
commitment o independence, a commitment o law, and a commitment
to process. These commitments look to the efficiency and fairness
factors discussed in Part III.A so that neither is decreased in order to
increase the other. Admittedly, it is possible that firms could satisfy
some of these commitments with a non-institutional LAP approach.
Without the personnel, market credibility, and longevity of an arbitral
institution, however, it would be highly challenging to satisfy these
commitments consistently.
1. Commitment to Independence
Institutional independence signals that a firm's corporate
governance is constrained by an exogenous adjudicative authority. A
corporation's credible commitment to submit intracorporate disputes
183. Hall Street Assocs., L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 588 (2008).
184. Cf Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S.
614, 657 (1985) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("Despotic decisionmaking of this kind is
fine for parties who are willing to agree in advance to settle for a best approximation
of the correct result in order to resolve quickly and inexpensively any contractual
dispute that may arise in an ongoing commercial relationship. Such informality,
however, is simply unacceptable when every error may have devastating
consequences for important businesses in our national economy and may undermine
their ability to compete in world markets.").
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to an institution frees that institution to act independently, i.e., to
adjudicate without bias and to impose procedural rules aimed at
increasing efficiency and fairness, and thus, firm value. This
independence means overcoming the repeat-player problem: if
management is disappointed with the outcome in case n, it cannot
easily change the rules to improve its outcome in case n+l. It also
means that the institution does not face implicit threats that it will lose
its caseload or funding if defendants are disappointed with its
decisions.
The credibility of the commitment is two-sided. Management
can lock itself in and promise to submit its intracorporate disputes to
a given institution and its rules, but, owing to its power to amend the
firm's bylaws, management holds a key to its own cell. The institution
can, however, impose costs on firms and their management in
exercising that power, which would effect a constraint on exit that in
turn bolsters the overall credibility of the commitment between the
firm, the institution, and the rules.
First, a fairly credible commitment can be effected by a firm
itself, either as a matter of shareholder democracy or routine investor
relations. For example, it might submit an TAP to a shareholder vote
as a charter amendment, thereby protecting the lAP from unilateral
amendment by the board of directors. In weaker forms of this
shareholder-centric approach, a firm might submit an LAP bylaw for
non-binding shareholder approval, or management may simply (and
strenuously) communicate to investors that it is committed to the
firm's IAP and its designated arbitral institution and rules. In these
weaker cases, a board of directors is not legally constrained: it may
break its commitment by unilaterally amending the LAP, but doing so
risks shareholder opposition, e.g., from selling shares, proxy contests,
shareholder proposals, withheld votes for directors' elections, or
litigation.
This commitment can be helped along through institutional
design, which should include the power to refuse to take
jurisdiction.185 This power to refuse can be one of the strongest
185. For example, in In re Salomon Inc. Shareholders' Litigation, an
employment agreement was used to compel arbitration of a shareholder derivative
claim before the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE). 68 F.3d 554, 556 (2nd Cir.
1995). The NYSE, however, invoked a provision of its constitution allowing it to
decline jurisdiction. Id. The district court refused to appoint a substitute arbitrator,
reasoning that the arbitration agreement had been followed, i.e., the case was sent to
arbitration, the arbitrator refused jurisdiction, and thus to trial the matter must go.
Id. at 556-57. The Second Circuit affirmed, observing that "the arbitration
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defenses to institutional independence. The power to refuse means that
a credible arbitral institution has internal jurisdictional rules to accept
cases only when a firm has made a pre-dispute commitment to the
institution as its exclusive forum and has also fulfilled its ongoing
obligations (e.g., paying annual fees to help fund the institution). The
power to refuse has teeth. If a firm has adopted an LAP and is unable
to use it (because the institution designated in the provisions refuses
to take jurisdiction), not only does the firm lose the benefits it intended
to receive, but management loses face amidst a potentially sensitive,
public litigation. 
186
This point conceives of arbitral institutions as akin to insurers.
To have a loss covered by insurance, one must have bought a policy
before the loss event.187 Here, in order to have its intracorporate cases
adjudicated by an arbitral institution, the firm must have already
adopted an LAP that commits it to that institution and its rules. The
insurance comparison grows stronger considering that annual fees
might naturally go up based on the number and outcomes of firms with
intracorporate disputes, just as insurance premiums go up and down
based on experience ratings. 
188
The power to refuse jurisdiction allows an arbitral institution
to strengthen firms' commitment by imposing conditions to entry. And
the ability to impose conditions to entry also implies the ability to
constrain exit. Assume that institutional jurisdictional rules would
require privity between the firm and the institution, say, through a
membership agreement. If one role of the arbitral institution is to
agreements here required that any arbitration be before the NYSE, and not before
any other arbitral forum." Id. at 561.
186. For example, if a firm faces an intracorporate dispute and the arbitral
institution designated in its LAP refuses to take jurisdiction, then the board is left
with few options. See id. It could amend its IAP to specify non-institutional arbitral
procedures or to designate another arbitral institution. Either of those amendments
would come on an "unclear day" however and thus subject the directors to added
scrutiny. But see Hills Stores Co. v. Bozic, 769 A.2d 88,107 (Del. Ch. 2000) (noting
that enforcement of a defensive measure may still be scrutinized even if the measure
was adopted on a clear day). The board could also waive its lAP, accept litigation in
a public court, and forgo all of the benefits the LAP was intended to achieve.
187. 44 AM. JUR. 2d Insurance § 812 (2018) ("Payment of premiums is a
crucial factor in determining whether the insured is covered for specific types of
risks.").
188. See Almon R. Arnold, Experience Rating, 55 YALE L.J. 218 (1945)
(experience rating in unemployment insurance). These fees would presumably be
more than offset by direct and indirect savings attributable to the move to
intracorporate arbitration (see supra Part II.B (discussing the benefit-cost analysis
of IAP adoption)).
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constrain management exogenously, a membership agreement could
keep management from breaking its announced commitment. The
agreement might, for example, impose a waiting period before a firm
may designate another arbitral institution (or a non-institutional
arbitral procedure), subject to exceptions for the exercise of directors'
fiduciary duties, shareholder approval, or other good-cause standards.
Constraints on exit would not entirely prevent a board from amending
its LAP. There may be legitimate and compelling business reasons for
doing so that are consistent with a firm's interests. The stickiness they
and other commitment mechanisms would generate together,
however, would help ensure that those changes are made only for
compelling and good reasons.
As a consequence of these commitment mechanisms, taken
together, both an arbitral institution and the market can be confident
in the independence of that institution and its integrity as an exogenous
adjudicative authority. To that end, it is not hard to imagine a world in
which firms seek to inspire market confidence by committing to an
arbitral institution and in which successful arbitral institutions, by
controlling entry and exit, will be able to protect their independence. 
189
2. Commitment to Law
i. A credible arbitral institution follows
the law
Arbitrators, like public courts, must follow the law.190 As a
practical matter, however, arbitrators have a freer hand in applying
controlling law than do public judges; they needed not issue reasoned
decisions and, when they do, their legal conclusions are subject to
highly deferential review.191 A lack of explicit and thorough legal
189. In this regard, the arbitral institution is a positive signal to the market
about the quality of the firm's governance, just as stock-exchange listing
requirements do now. See Paul G. Mahoney, The Exchange as Regulator, 83 VA. L.
REv. 1453, 1457 (1997) ("Exchanges should have strong incentives to adopt rules
that benefit investors."); Douglas C. Michael, Untenable Status of Corporate
Governance Listing Standards Under the Securities Exchange Act, 47 Bus. LAW.
1461, 1468-69 (1992) ("A listing does, of course, confirm the legitimacy of the
issuer and the security, but the NYSE's development of corporate governance listing
standards, even in its infancy, indicated a concern beyond assuring such basic
requirements.").
190. Mitsubishi Motors Corp., 473 U.S. at 619-20.
191. Arbitral awards may be vacated on a manifest-disregard-of-law standard.
See Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 437 (1953), overruled on other grounds by
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analysis may suit two-party commercial or low-stakes consumer
arbitrations. But it does not suffice for intracorporate disputes, which
determine the relative rights of disparate stakeholders to assets that
may be valued in the many billions of dollars.1 92 More, the corporate
law that applies to a firm is one determinant of its overall agency costs;
markets need uniformity and predictability in how that law applies to
a firm's governance in order to assess its value. 1
93
To achieve this uniformity and predictability, an arbitral
institution fills the role of a state court adjudicating an intracorporate
dispute involving a foreign corporation. In this mindset, arbitrators
adjudicate intracorporate disputes in accord with the corporate statutes
and case law of the firm's chartering jurisdiction. Not only is this the
appropriate legal-analytical approach to adjudicating intracorporate
disputes, but it also signals to the market that a firm's governance
follows predictable rules.
This principle also implies that an arbitral institution will
employ high-quality arbitrators who are expert in substantive law and
competent in managing the adjudicative process. These arbitrators
might include retired judges, legal academics, practitioners, or even
experienced businesspeople. Indeed, the benefits of expert
adjudicators may be felt especially by firms chartered in states that
lack judiciaries experienced with complex corporate cases or that have
political, social, or economic conditions that may impede impartial
adjudication. One appeal of leading chartering jurisdictions like
Delaware and Maryland is the quality of their judiciaries. For firms
incorporated in other states, arbitral institutions may substitute for
judicial corporate-law expertise, thereby reducing the risk (i.e.,
Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Exp. Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989). This
standard, however, is forgiving and can be hard to police, particularly when
arbitrators do not issue written opinions. See Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith,
Inc. v. Jaros, 70 F.3d 418, 421 (6th Cir. 1995) ("When faced with questions of law,
an arbitration panel does not act in manifest disregard of the law unless (1) the
applicable legal principle is clearly defined and not subject o reasonable debate; and
(2) the arbitrators refused to heed that legal principle.").
192. See Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 31-32 (responding to the petitioner's argument
that arbitration's lack of written decisions impoverishes law development by noting
that the NYSE's arbitration rules require written decisions, and that, nevertheless,
settlement agreements do not produce precedent).
193. See Robert Daines, Does Delaware Law Improve Firm Value?, 62 J. FIN.
ECON. 525 (2001).
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unreliable or unpredictable courts) of incorporating in a non-leading
jurisdiction.194
ii. A credible arbitral institution develops
the law
As Part II.C notes, states might actively oppose lAPs because
of their potential to impoverish the development of local corporate
law. This is a real problem: reduced intracorporate caseloads result in
fewer opportunities for judges to expand, explain, or modify the law.
In turn, this diminished output of precedent means that going forward,
the application of corporate law is less predictable than it otherwise
could be, an implicit cost imposed both on lAP adopters and non-
adopters. Arbitral institutions have the ability to mitigate this issue by
actively contributing to the development of the law.
Well-reasoned arbitral decisions stand to become persuasive
authority, thus mitigating the problem of impoverishing law
development. Of course, only chartering-jurisdiction precedent is
binding on the resolution of a corporation's intracorporate disputes. 
195
But, judicial precedents of State X construing the law of State Y are
persuasive, both for State Y itself and its sister courts. 196 This
persuasive authority derives partly from the comity states show each
other under our federal system. An arbitral institution may not, of
course, receive this same consideration. But persuasiveness is also a
function of the reputation of the adjudicator, the integrity of the
proceeding, and, perhaps most importantly, the insight and rigor of the
legal analysis. 197 An arbitral institution is fully capable of exhibiting
194. See Black, supra note 179 ("If a state's precedents are thin, it can use
Delaware case law as precedent in its courts until a base of domestic precedents is
built up."); but cf Perschbacher & Basset, supra note 163 (suggesting that potential
precedents may be "lost" as a result of arbitration).
195. See CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69, 90 (1987) ("[A]
corporation---except in the rarest situations-is organized under, and governed by,
the law of a single jurisdiction, traditionally the corporate law of the State of its
incorporation.").
196. 20 AM. JUR. 2d Courts § 139 (2018) ("The decision of a state court does
not have stare decisis effect in a court of another state. However, such decisions may
guide a state court's decisions ....").
197. Frederick Schauer, Authority and Authorities, 94 VA. L. REV. 1931, 1946-
47 (2008) ("A judge in the Southern District of New York is required to follow
Second Circuit and Supreme Court decisions but is not required to follow or even
notice the conclusions of the Eastern District of New York, the New York Court of
Appeals, the Third Circuit, Wigmore on Evidence, the Harvard Law Review, the
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these qualities. An institution that develops a reputation among judges
and market participants as thoughtfully handling novel issues may
well see its reasoning followed by courts.198 Indeed, courts already
consult secondary sources such as restatements, treatises, and
normative scholarship in tackling novel questions. 199 Because arbitral
precedents apply the law to actual controversies that are tested through
the adversarial process, they may well come to be consulted
frequently, even if they do not carry the prestige of judicial
precedents.
200
The role of an arbitral institution in law development may be
especially salutary for states that lack a well-developed corporate case
law. For these states, an arbitral institution's reasoned application of
their laws may increase market perceptions of predictability and
consequently lower the risks of non-uniformity or unpredictability
previously attributed to them. This persuasive authority may on the
margins prompt firm organizers to choose to organize in states with
(as of now) underdeveloped corporate case law. This move would in
turn lead to a virtuous cycle of increased caseloads in those states and,
with them, further law development and a more competitive national
market for corporate chartering.
iii. A credible arbitral institution corrects
its errors
A common feature of arbitration is its one-step, binding nature
and focus on bringing quick and economical ends to disputes.
Appealing an arbitral decision undermines this economy.20 1 Besides,
High Court of Australia, the Constitutional Court of South Africa, or the European
Court of Human Rights.").
198. Cf id. at 1943 ("[I]f an agent is genuinely persuaded of some conclusion
because she has come to accept the substantive reasons offered for that conclusion
by someone else, then authority has nothing to do with it.").
199. See id. at 1947 (explaining that a judge of the Southern District of New
York may consult any of the non-binding sources of law mentioned supra note 197,
but that it would be controversial for her to consult astrology, family conversations,
tabloids, or the Bible).
200. See Andrea K. Bjorklund, The Emerging Civilization of Investment
Arbitration, 113 PENN ST. L. REv. 1269, 1273 (2009) ("[T]he public availability of
arbitral awards facilitates the subsequent referral to prior awards in the development
of a jurisprudence constant in international investment law.").
201. The FAA provides limited grounds for the vacation of arbitral awards. See
supra note 124 and accompanying text. Parties to an arbitration agreement may not
contractually expand the FAA's grounds for federal-court review of arbitral
decisions. See Hall Street Assocs., L.L.C., 552 U.S. at 589 ("[T]he statutory text
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the idea of appealing an arbitral decision at first sounds procedurally
unworkable because arbitrations typically do not produce much of a
record and thus leave few, if any, errors to correct on appeal, short of
hearing a case de novo.20 2 Yet, although non-appealability may be a
feature for commercial and consumer arbitrations, it is a bug for
intracorporate arbitrations. Intracorporate disputes affect the interests
of disparate shareholders and may determine the control of substantial
corporate assets. In "bet-the-company" scenarios, non-appealable
adjudication is trapeze without a net.2°3 The risk of prejudicial error
may be small, but it is real. For example, one analysis found that the
Delaware Court of Chancery's overall reversal rate in 2002 was
0.26%, or 16.4% of appealed cases.2°4 This analysis illustrates that
even for a highly-regarded judiciary like Delaware's, appeals provide
an error-correcting benefit in a meaningful share of cases. Moreover,
beyond the professional motivation to reach legally and factually
correct decisions, the possibility of appeal may motivate arbitrators to
adhere all the closer to the law and to follow their institution's rules.205
gives us no business to expand the statutory grounds [for judicial review of arbitral
decisions].").
202. Cf Wilko, 346 U.S. at 436 (1953) ("As their award may be made without
explanation of their reasons and without a complete record of their proceedings, the
arbitrators' conception of the legal meaning of such statutory requirements as
'burden of proof,' 'reasonable care' or 'material fact,' . . . cannot be examined.");
INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR CONFLICT PREVENTION & RESOLUTION, CPR
ARBITRATION APPEAL PROCEDURE AND COMMENTARY 6 (2007) (setting as pre-
conditions for arbitration appeals "[that] the arbitrators in the original proceeding be
required to apply the law, [and that there be] a record of the original proceeding and
a written award stating findings of fact and conclusions of law.").
203. John C. Coates IV, Managing Disputes Through Contract, Evidence from
M&A, 2 HARv. BUS. L. REV. 295, 310-11 (2012) (suggesting that in the public-
company M&A context, arbitration is disfavored by parties because "reduced appeal
rights mean that arbitration decisions can be expected to be less 'accurate' .. . than
other decisions."). Cf Mitsubishi Motors Corp., 473 U.S. at 656-57 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) ("Arbitration awards are only reviewable for manifest disregard of the
law.., and the rudimentary procedures which make arbitration so desirable in the
context of a private dispute often mean that the record is so inadequate that the
arbitrator's decision is virtually unreviewable.").
204. William B. Chandler III & Anthony A. Rickey, Manufacturing Mystery:
A Response to Professors Carney and Shepherd's "The Mystery of Delaware Law's
Continuing Success ", U. ILL. L. REV, 95, 104 (2009).
205. See generally David E. Klein & Robert J. Hume, Fear of Reversal as an
Explanation ofLower Court Compliance, 37 L. & SOC. REV. 579 (2003) (suggesting
that the fear of reversal by an appellate court motivates trial judges to comply with
the law); cf Reuben, supra note 129, at 1149 ("[A]n arbitrator is more likely to be
careful in rendering the award because of concerns about his reputation than for fear
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No one, after all, likes to be reversed. An added effect of appealability
is that arbitrators would follow their institution's own state-law
precedents absent superseding authority from state courts or statute. In
that light, the arbitral appeals process would contribute to the
institution's law-development role and would help it avoid internal
decisional conflicts.
This institutional model presumes no appellate-procedural
design in particular. An arbitral institution could replicate the two-
tiered appellate model used by the federal and many state judiciaries.
Or, it could follow Delaware, where only one tier of appellate review
suffices.206 Whatever the appellate-procedural design, however,
appeals are an important contingency, both for ex ante disciplining of
first-level arbitrators and for ex post error correction. The principles
expressed by the commitment to law and the commitment o process
sections in this Part aim to ensure that appeals are available and that
records get generated, in turn making the error-correction work of
appeals possible.
3. Commitment to Process
Part III.A argues that, ceteris paribus, the efficiency and
fairness of the civil procedure applicable to an intracorporate dispute
partly determines a firm's ex ante and ex post agency costs.
Intracorporate arbitration gives firms the ability to lever their agency
costs through the procedures they choose. In that light, intracorporate
arbitration can be thought of not only as a forum-selection decision,
but also as a procedure-selection decision. This design principle urges
that a credible institution is committed to process, i.e., to developing
and effecting efficient and fair arbitral procedures. What those
procedures look like and what starting point they use--e.g., the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or the American Arbitration
Association's Commercial Arbitration Rules and Mediation
Procedures-is beyond this article, but it does offer these two points
on institutional design.
First, procedural rules available to an LAP-adopting firm
should be flexible, but not limitless. Increased competition among rule
of being vacated because of manifest disregard of the law, especially when
application of the doctrine is so rare.").
206. The same one-tier review may well suffice for arbitral institutions, too:
apart from merely being sufficient, two levels of review would perhaps diminish
efficiency without offering a compensating gain to fairness (which, in the appellate
setting, means error correction).
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sets would be a positive market development, but endless variety
would overwhelm market participants and make meaningful
comparisons between corporate-governance arrangements difficult.
An arbitral institution should develop rule sets calibrated to the needs
of different firms based on their shareholder compositions, life stages,
public or private status, size, or even, potentially, industry. For
example, the procedures applicable to a public large-cap company
may require more formality than those of closely held private
concerns. Which rule set applies to a given firm need not be left to
management's choosing, but might well be categorical. For example,
the SEC and national stock exchanges classify companies according
to shareholding, market capitalization, and other metrics and impose
some rules on them based on those classifications.20 7 With categorical
rule sets, a large-cap company might be required to use procedures
designed to safeguard the interests of disparate shareholders, like
requiring public,20 8 reasoned decisions and more plaintiff-friendly
discovery defaults.
Beyond categorical defaults based on firm type, an arbitral
institution might-and probably should-offer procedural opt-ins and
opt-outs consistent with its conception of what an efficient and fair
procedure looks like for a given type of firm. For example, private and
small-cap public companies might be allowed to opt for more
streamlined procedures, or private companies might be allowed to opt
for non-public decisions. By setting a procedural baseline appropriate
to different firm types, an arbitral institution will nurture its own
credibility in the market. At the same time, providing some optionality
would allow firms themselves to calibrate the rules that apply to their
unique circumstances and thus, ideally, to recognize marginal
increases to their value.
Second, the development of procedural rule sets should be the
collaborative effort of intracorporate stakeholders, including
representatives of management; institutional and retail shareholders;
corporate-finance and legal scholars; and legal, financial, accounting,
and other practitioners. That is to say that an institution's arbitral
procedures should be developed by multi-stakeholder panels that
207. See SEC Regulation 12B, 17 C.F.R. § 240.12b-2 (defining "accelerated
filer," "large accelerated filer," and "emerging growth company" based in part on
revenue or market capitalization); NYSE LISTED COMPANY MANUAL § 1 (2018)
(setting listing rules based on, inter alia, issuer type and capitalization).
208. Professor Jennifer Arlen has argued, for example, that "[i]f you take
shareholder suits out of the light of day and put them in a dark closet, you lose the
deterrent effect." Frankel, supra note 7.
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combine interest with expertise. An institution might, for example,
convene multiple panels to deal with different procedural rule sets,
appellate procedures, ethical codes, and administrative concerns. The
recommendations of these panels to amend or add rules would
subsequently be taken up by a governing body within the institution
(just as advisory committees within the federal judiciary recommend
rule amendments for adoption by the Supreme Court).2°9 Of the
different ways for developing an institution's procedures, a multi-
stakeholder approach would be the most likely to set up efficient and
fair arbitral procedures and practice. That is because this approach
ensures that procedural designs are thoughtfully considered by an
array of experts and interested parties whose participation conveys this
fact to the market and who contribute their own professional
credibility in joining the effort.
CONCLUSION
As a matter of state corporate and federal arbitration law, firms
may adopt LAPs. For the most part, they have yet to do so, but the trend
toward LAPs may be approaching. After all, one of the most significant
barriers to IAP adoption-the opposition of the SEC-is now in
serious question. But from here, firms will only adopt IAPs when they
result in greater benefits than costs. Thus, the current state of non-
adoption owes in significant part to the costs associated with adopting
an uncommon defensive corporate-governance feature. That is, will
we be sued, what will investors think, and similar questions.
LAPs will emerge as a regular feature of U.S. public-company
governance in two stages, the second of which is not guaranteed to
come along. In the first stage, firms will become early adopters if they
are less sensitive to the costs of early adoption than their peers. These
firms may be PO companies (particularly ones with founders who are
active in their management) that face lower potential market costs to
adopting novel corporate-governance f atures. Those features would
not depart from a preexisting governance baseline (because the
company doesn't have one). Early adopters may also be companies
that face significant or frequent intracorporate litigation, whether
meritorious or not, and thus have more to gain than to lose from
adopting an LAP. Of course, they may also be firms whose
209. 1 GUIDE TO JUDICIARY POLICY, Procedures for the Judicial Conference's
Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure and Its Advisory Rules Committees
§ 440 (2011) (setting procedures for advisory rules committees).
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management is motivated to thwart monitoring or discipline by its
shareholders. And in the second stage of LAP adoption, if it comes, the
prior early adoptions will have given the market comfort that when
these provisions are adopted and implemented appropriately, their
effect on firm value is likely to be positive. To be sure, for early
adopters, too, LAPs may lead to an increase in firm value, but that
increase would result from outsized benefits offsetting outsized
costs.
2 10
As Part III lays out, the second stage of IAP adoption is most
likely to be reached if early firms do not adopt non-institutional
provisions, but rather make credible commitments to credible arbitral
institutions. This article has explained, in broad principles, what a
credible arbitral institution looks like. Its project is incomplete. Those
principles must still be expanded upon and turned into real institutions.
Doing so will perhaps not be an undertaking that requires great
ingenuity or novelty because there are already established models for
arbitral institutions. These examples include the industry-based
takeover panel that governs, and adjudicates disputes over, M&A
transactions in the United Kingdom.211 Closer to home, internal
judicial bodies within the national stock exchanges or FINRA show
that important corporate and financial disputes can be appropriately
adjudicated outside public courts.
212
None of these dispute-resolution i stitutions have been set up
to handle the full array of intracorporate disputes (not to mention more
than fifty state and territorial corporate laws under which those
disputes arise). They do, however, offer best practices and learning
that can be applied to the institutional model presented here. If IAPs
are in the offing, and if this article is more or less on point in terms of
the pitfalls to IAPs it presents, then market participants, practitioners,
and scholars must confront what intracorporate arbitration is to look
210. See supra Part II.B.
211. See THE PANEL ON TAKEOVERS AND MERGERS, THE CITY CODE ON
TAKEOVERS AND MERGERS (2016).
212. NYSE LISTED COMPANY MANUAL § 8 (setting forth the procedures for
involuntary delisting and internal appeals); THE NASDAQ STOCK MARKET RULES,
Equity Rule 10001 (2008) (delegating certain arbitration functions to FINRA);
FINRA, Arbitration and Mediation, FINRA.ORG, https://www.finra.org/arbitration-
and-mediation. See also Ed Beeson, Law360's FINRA Arbitration Cheat Sheet,
LAw360 (Feb. 22, 2016), https://www.law360.com/articles/761547 ("Call it the
Thunderdome of the securities industry. For the 4,000 firms, 637,000 registered
representatives and millions of investors in the U.S. brokerage industry, there's
practically one way to settle disputes: Financial Industry Regulatory Authority
arbitration.").
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like. What will the arbitral institutions be? How will they work? Who
will staff them? What empirical effects will they have? How will
objections to them be overcome? Those questions remain outstanding,
but this article has begun pushing them toward resolution.

